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                                                                             It may be that the gulfs will wash us down… 
                                                                                It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles… 
                                                                         We are not now that strength which in old days 
                                                                   moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are! 
                                                                  Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to                         
strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. 
Lord Alfred Tennyson, Ulysses 
 
 
                                                           Forse i vortici ci trascineranno giù,  
                                                               forse noi approderemo su isole felici,  
                                                                        e anche se non avremo la forza di un tempo  
                                                   che mosse la Terra e il Paradiso  
                                          comunque ci siamo, siamo qui!  
                                                       Indeboliti dal Tempo e dal Fato,  
                                      ma forti nel desiderio  
                                                                     per combattere, per cercare, per trovare.  
                                       E non per arrenderci."  
Lord Alfred Tennyson, Ulysses 
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Abstract  
Equity crowdfunding is becoming more and more an important source of funds to early-
stage entrepreneurial firms, in both developed and developing countries. Its rapid growth was 
likely due to a combination of favourable – and unfavourable - circumstances which have made 
it a multi-billion-dollar industry worldwide. On the one hand, the 2008 financial crisis has 
tightened credit availability; on the other hand, financial innovations driven by FinTech 
companies (including equity crowdfunding platforms) have provided consumers with an 
excellent opportunity to become investors and take advantage of their knowledge in financial 
matters. Moreover, financial innovations and the new instruments available have facilitated 
credit access for entrepreneurs, enabling them to seek funding from anyone. Equity 
crowdfunding seems thus to have the potential to fundamentally change the investment and 
financing process, as well as to provide greater transparency especially in countries where high 
levels of corruption discourage any form of public or private investment. 
The academic literature on this topic has analysed the crowdfunding market with 
growing interest. However, the research and knowledge of this new phenomenon are still 
limited, and some questions do still arise.  
This doctoral thesis aims to address the topic of equity crowdfunding in Europe and 
Latin America (the higher performing developing country in terms of utilizing crowdfunding, 
excluding Mainland China). In particular, the three papers that constitute it explores specific 
strategies to drive equity crowdfunding growth and promote its use in financing 
entrepreneurship. This dissertation draws inspiration from the following research questions: (i) 
Why do we need a harmonised regulation of crowdfunding in Europe? What are the challenges 
and risks to deal with? (ii) Do tax incentives promote crowdfunding investment in Europe? (iii) 
Does the fight against corruption increase the investors’ confidence in equity crowdfunding? 
Answers to these questions provide an important step towards a better understanding of 
the functioning of crowdfunding markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1  
Introduction  
 
New digital technologies radically changed the economy, generating consequences in 
all economic sectors and starting what is called the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0). 
The trend toward digitalization and technological innovation has reshaped the financial sector 
by changing the way customers and businesses access financial services. Financial 
technologies, known as FinTech, have fuelled the emergence of a new generation of companies 
innovative enough to offer intelligent, however easy-to-use financial solutions through the 
application of novel technologies and concepts. As a result, user-friendly financial products and 
services, with a greater level of efficiency, transparency, and flexibility than traditional ones 
are being made available. In such a highly dynamic scenario, FinTech companies are able to 
fulfil customers’ needs that have previously not (or not sufficiently) been met by traditional 
financial service providers.  
Belonging to the FinTech revolution, crowdfunding is a comprehensive term used to 
describe a new form of funding projects, companies or ideas by raising many small amounts of 
capital from a large number of people, typically via the online platforms (Ahlers et al., 2015). 
Crowdfunding platforms provide funding in a digital environment, thus eliminating the 
requirement for physical interaction and consequently reducing transaction costs as well as 
transaction time.  This novel form of financial intermediation makes easier for those seeking 
funding (whether people or companies) to reach a high number of potential investors, who will 
receive some form of physical or moral reward in proportion to the invested funds (Zhang and 
Liu, 2012). Since its inception in 2006, various models of crowdfunding have been created, 
depending on the way in which investors are recompensed. In particular, it is possible to 
distinguish four main types of crowdfunding models (Mollick, 2014): 
1) The donation-based crowdfunding is a simple model generally used for social or 
charitable causes. The investors are mainly driven by altruistic motivation and they 
donate money without expecting something in return. Examples of donation-based 
crowdfunding platforms include GoFundMe (http://www.gofundme.com/), YouCaring 
(https://www.youcaring.com/) and Crowdrise (https://www.crowdrise.com/);  
2) The reward-based crowdfunding is the most popular model. As the name suggests, 
investors receive a reward based on the amount of money they brought to the project. 
Rewards may range from something simple such as a thank-you postcard to a prototype 
of the product. Cash prizes are never allowed. This model is mainly used for creative 
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projects, ranging from arts, music, games, to design and technology. Moreover, reward 
model is often used as a form of pre-selling prior to market entry. Two of the oldest and 
largest reward-based crowdfunding platforms are Kickstarter 
(http://www.kickstarter.com) and Indiegogo  (https://www.indiegogo.com/);  
3) The lending-based crowdfunding, in both consumer (P2P- peer-to-peer) and business 
(P2B- peer-to-business) lending form, accounts for the largest market segment of 
Alternative Finance in Europe (Ziegler et al., 2018). In this type of crowdfunding, 
investors provide funds through small loans to consumers or business and obtain 
repayment with interest in return. This is a way to borrow money at a lower cost 
compared to the credits that banks can propose. Examples of this model include Prosper 
(https://www.prosper.com/), Twino (https://www.twino.eu/), and Bondora 
(https://www.bondora.com/); 
4) The equity-based crowdfunding offers to investors the opportunity to become 
shareholders in the funded company through the purchase of a small equity stake. In 
return for their funding contributions, investors will share the potential profits of the 
business. This participatory financing with equity participation is a solution for early 
stage unlisted companies that are too small and risky to obtain funding in the traditional 
way. One of the world’s first equity-based crowdfunding platforms is the English 
Crowdcube (https://www.crowdcube.com/) launched in 2010. 
 
Table 1 shown crowdfunding models according to the funding form, the expected return, 
and the main sector. 
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Table 1. Crowdfunding Models  
 
Model Funding form Expected return Main sector 
Donation 
Support for non-
profit projects 
No expectation of 
returns 
   Charity and  Philanthropy 
Reward 
Financial support 
mostly for creative 
projects 
Non-monetary 
rewards or products 
         Art, Music, and Design 
Lending 
Financing of loans 
to private persons 
(P2P) or companies 
(P2B) 
Repayment of capital 
and interest 
           Education and Research 
Equity 
Equity investment 
mostly in start-ups 
Profit sharing               Tech & Innovation  
Source: Author elaboration 
 
Using social networks, social profiles, and the viral nature of web-based 
communication, individuals and companies have raised billions of dollars in lending, equity, 
reward and donations for projects over the last few years. According to the 3rd annual European 
Alternative Finance Industry Report (Ziegler et al., 2018), the European market has grown by 
41% in 2016, reaching €7.7 billion and doubling its volumes from 20151. The United Kingdom 
still remains the largest online alternative finance market, with a market volume in Europe of € 
5.6 billion, followed by France (€ 443.98 million), Germany (€ 321.84 million) the Netherlands 
(€ 194.19 million), Finland (€ 142.23 million), Spain (€ 130.90 million), Italy (€ 127.06 million) 
and Georgia (€ 102.58 million). This new form of financing has emerged in the wake of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis which severely affected terms and conditions of European SMEs and 
start-ups’ funding (Brown and Earle, 2017; Cosh et al., 2009), by forcing them to use lending 
channels different from the banking ones, such as venture capital, business angels and, more 
recently, crowdfunding.  These platforms, by facilitating the matching process between 
                                                          
1 The report is based on 344 crowdfunding, P2P lending and other alternative finance platforms across 45 European 
countries. 
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ventures and potential investors, have enriched the diversification of the financing industry 
changing the way people, businesses and institutions access and invest money. 
Over the past decade, crowdfunding (notably in the equity model) has established itself 
as a new player in the entrepreneurial finance market that is capable of supporting 
entrepreneurship and employment creation, and spur growth. Its role in the seed and early-stage 
financing of entrepreneurial projects has grown rapidly across the developed world 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012; Wilson and Testoni, 2014; Bruton et al., 2015) and is now 
attracting considerable interest in the developing world as well, where the banking system is 
often underdeveloped (World Bank, 2013; World Bank Group, 2015; Wardrop et al., 2016). In 
these countries, crowdfunding is demonstrating its ability to deliver capital more efficiently to 
a large number of business and entrepreneurs than has been possible in the past. Data from the 
“Crowdfunding’s Potential for the Developing World Report” (World Bank, 2013) shows that 
there are up to 344 million households in the developing world able to make small crowdfund 
investments. The total market potential by 2025 is estimated to be up to US $90-96 billion per 
year. Among developing countries (excluding Mainland China2) Latin America is the higher 
performing in terms of utilizing crowdfunding.  As shown by the “2017 Americas Alternative 
Finance Industry Report” (Ziegler et al., 2017), in 2016, the Latin America online alternative 
finance industry grew to $342.1 million, a significant increase compared to the $110.6 million 
in 2015 and the $56.2 million in 2014. Of the $342.1 million 2016 total, more than $230 million 
came from alternative finance platforms focused on small business financing. In particular, 
lending-based models accounted for $218.4 million, while equity-based models accounted for 
$10.4 million (the 70% of the equity-based business finance in Latin America). High volume 
markets include Mexico ($114.2 million), that led equity-based business finance, generating 
approximately 48% of the segment ($4.9 million). Chile ($97.8 million), Brazil ($64.4 million) 
and Argentina ($12.6 million) follow. Compared to other countries with robust crowdfunding 
industries in place, data show that Latin America has grown very quickly and appear to have 
good potential in this new form of finance. Beyond the traditional forms of financing (i.e. banks, 
public grants, venture capital, private equity, business angels), equity crowdfunding platforms 
allow successful businesses to attract international investors outside of traditional Global 
Financial Centres.  
Figure 1 shows the growth in volume terms of the alternative finance market from 2013 to 2016 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (the four most active Latin America countries). 
                                                          
2 With $101.7 billion in total transaction volume in 2015, China is the world’s largest online alternative finance 
market (Zhang et al., 2016). 
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Figure 1. Alternative Finance Market Total Volume, 2013-2016 ($USD) 
Source: Author elaboration based on data from Ziegler et al. (2018) 
 
In Latin America as much as in Europe, the equity crowdfunding platforms attract 
companies and stimulate investment in innovative start-ups and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), thus playing a critical role in productive development, employment, and economic 
growth. However, this type of crowdfunding seems to grow at a slower rate than lending-based 
counterpart due to regulatory constraints concerning equity-investments in businesses (Bruton 
et al., 2015). Its success depends on the ability of each country to develop forward-thinking 
regulations that can adapt to this new investment vehicle by ensuring a high level of investors' 
protection and providing tax incentive schemes in order to maximize its value. The lack of 
appropriate regulations creates an unpredictable environment and a state of uncertainty which 
is deterring investors and, as a consequence, strangles investments in crowdfunding (notably 
the lending and equity-based forms of crowdfunding). Moreover, building a functioning 
crowdfunding ecosystem depends on the ability of policymakers and regulators to remove 
cultural barriers and create and develop the "culture of trust" which is essential for the funding 
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of companies through crowdfunding platforms (World Bank, 2013). This culture of trust is not 
easy to establish in an opaque process like the online fundraising (Courtney et al., 2017; Ahlers 
et al., 2015) in which investors often have no pre-existing relationship with the funded 
companies and live hundreds or thousands of miles far from them (Agrawal et al., 2015; 
Günther, et al., 2018). A highly transparent system, defined by clear rules and providing 
protection from fraud, is a key enabler to build that trust culture, even in highly corrupted 
economies. 
 
Thesis Contribution 
 
The current dissertation, conducted with the "multiple paper thesis" method, shows the 
research activity conducted during the doctoral studies program pursued over three years. It 
aims at contributing to the ongoing debate on how to regulate and promote the crowdfunding 
market and to examine its impact on business finance in both developed and developing 
countries. The three papers that constitute this thesis explores specific strategies to drive equity 
crowdfunding growth and promote its use in financing entrepreneurship in Europe and Latin 
America - the higher performing developing country in terms of utilizing crowdfunding, 
excluding Mainland China. By recognising the importance of enhancing the knowledge of areas 
that have not been deeply investigated or completely clarified in the existing literature, the three 
studies get inspire from the following research questions: 
Research question 1: Why do we need a harmonised regulation of crowdfunding in Europe? 
What are the challenges and risks to deal with?  
Research question 2: Do tax incentives promote crowdfunding investment in Europe? 
Research question 3: Does the fight against corruption increase the investors’ confidence in 
equity crowdfunding? 
These questions suggest two complementary lines of research. On the one hand, an in-
depth analysis of the need, challenges, and risks of not harmonising the crowdfunding 
regulation in Europe, and the role played by the tax incentive schemes in fostering 
crowdfunding investment. On the other hand, an empirical analysis of the impact of new anti-
corruption legal frameworks - that restore investors’ confidence - on equity crowdfunding 
market in highly corrupted developing countries. More in details, this thesis makes several 
contributions to the literature. First, this is not the first study to discuss the regulatory reforms 
in different European countries from a theoretical perspective. Compared with prior literature 
(Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017; Kabai, 2017; Estrin et al., 2018 Macchiavello, 2018), the 
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first paper of this doctoral thesis addresses in its analysis and implications the issue of 
regulatory harmonisation, stating that establishing a single market for crowdfunding is a key 
enabling factor to building a successful crowdfunding ecosystem in Europe. 
Second, in this thesis, the role of tax incentive schemes in fostering equity crowdfunding 
investment in Europe is examined for the first time. By extending the prior literature, which 
widely recognised the effectiveness of tax incentives in promoting investment (Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2002 and 2004; Cowling et al., 2008; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Cumming and Li, 
2013; Wilson and Silva, 2013; Wilson, 2015; Munongo et al., 2017), the second paper provides 
a detailed and comprehensive analysis of tax incentives schemes in force in Europe for investors 
and companies planning to use crowdfunding as a fundraising tool. Building on a theoretical 
framework, it shows that the more tax incentives schemes are properly designed and tailored, 
the more investors, start-ups and other firms with low liquidity use crowdfunding as a source 
of funding. 
Third, this thesis suggests and demonstrates that the introduction of an anti-corruption 
framework affecting both public and private spheres has an important impact on the probability 
of success of equity crowdfunding projects in a highly corrupt environment. The role of 
regulatory quality is found to be significant in fighting corruption and, as consequence, in 
promoting investment, consistent with the prior literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Bénassy‐Quéré, 
2007; Busse and Hefeker, 2007). However, the extant research does not take into account the 
relationship between corruption and equity crowdfunding investment. By using a difference-
in-difference estimation model, the third paper offers empirical evidence from Brazil, Chile, 
and Mexico on the impact of anti-corruption regulation on equity crowdfunding investment. 
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Manuscript Reminder 
 
This doctoral thesis is structured as follows: 
 chapter 2 provides an in-depth description of how all different types of 
crowdfunding are treated under the national regulation of the following five 
countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain. Building on a 
theoretical framework of legislation, the study shows the importance to build a 
single market for crowdfunding and the complexities to achieve it in a fragmented 
Europe; 
 chapter 3 deeply analyses the different tax incentives schemes in force in UK, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, and make a comparison among them. Although 
all the investigated countries promote crowdfunding investment by offering tax 
incentives, the study finds evidence that the schemes in force could have a greater 
positive impact on the crowdfunding campaigns success, by better evaluating and 
taking into consideration the peculiarities of potential crowdfunding investors and 
firms that might take advantage of them; 
 chapter 4 presents the first empirical evidence of the causal relation between anti-
corruption rules and crowdfunding investment in a highly corrupted environment. 
Based on a unique hand-collected dataset of 492 successful and unsuccessful 
projects, listed on all existing equity crowdfunding platforms in Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico over the period 2013-2017, the study finds that anti-corruption laws 
affecting both public and private spheres is able to increase investors’ confidence in 
equity crowdfunding. 
 chapter 5 concludes this doctoral thesis.
18 
 
Chapter 2 
Harmonise Crowdfunding Regulation in Europe: Need, Challenges, 
and Risks  
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. On one hand, it aims to highlight the need, 
challenges, and risks posed by the too high level of heterogeneity in crowdfunding 
regulation among European countries; on the other hand, it aims to assess the regulatory 
reforms to be undertaken from European Authorities in order to harmonise crowdfunding 
regulation and create a European Single Market.  
A more aligned Pan-European market could facilitate cross-border transactions 
and increases investors protection (European Commission, 2018). However, 
policymakers and regulators have to implement the regulatory harmonisation process by 
carefully considering the specific features of each country. This chapter deals with the 
issue of the harmonisation of crowdfunding regulation in Europe which is currently the 
subject of debate by policymakers and regulators. To this end, an in-depth comparative 
analysis of the crowdfunding regulatory frameworks in force in the UK, France, Italy, 
and Spain is provided. The regulatory regimes are presented and discussed in the light of 
the harmonisation goal of crowdfunding regulation in Europe. Findings show that 
crowdfunding market is negatively affected by regulatory heterogeneity. To overcome 
the barriers hampering the regulatory harmonisation, European countries have to shape 
the highly heterogeneous nature of their regulatory environments in order to achieve a 
level playing field for all market actors in Europe and to create a more open crowdfunding 
ecosystem. Direct implications for future regulation in the crowdfunding industry are 
found. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past years, crowdfunding (CF) has emerged as a new way to finance 
projects, ideas or new ventures by raising normally small amounts of money from a large 
number of investors through online platforms (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014). 
Since its inception in 2008, crowdfunding transactions volume has grown considerably at 
European level. According to the 3rd annual European Alternative Finance Industry 
Report (Ziegler et al., 2018), the European market has grown by 41% in 2016, reaching 
€7.7 billion and doubling its volumes from 20153. The United Kingdom is the largest 
individual online alternative finance market, with a volume in Europe of €5.6 billion, 
followed by France (€443.98 million), Germany (€321.84 million) the Netherlands 
(€194.19 million), Finland (€142.23million), Spain (€130.90million), Italy 
(€127.06million) and Georgia (€102.58million).     
Literature has widely recognized the importance of and need for crowdfunding 
(notably in the equity-based form) as alternative way of funding new business ventures 
for which conventional ways of funding are often unavailable (e.g., Schwienbacher and 
Larralde, 2012; Bruton et al., 2015; Wardrop et al., 2015; Vulkan et al., 2016; Cumming 
and Vismara, 2017; Short et al., 2017; Leboeuf and Schwienbacher, 2018; Estrin et al., 
2018).  
The rapid growth of crowdfunding has created serious challenges for 
policymakers and regulators around the world with financial stability implications 
(Financial Stability Board, 2017), and has drew the attention of academic world (Moritz 
and Block 2016). Legal scholars in the United States heavily discussed (i) the legislative 
changes to enable crowdfunding and provide investor protection (Bradford, 2012a and 
2018; Hazen, 2012; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Stemler, 2013), (ii) the application of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (Bradford, 2012; Sigar, 2012), and (iii) the entry into force of the 
JOBS Act on April 5, 2012 (Knight et al., 2012), in particular of its Title III - also referred 
to as CROWDFUNDING Act - (Wroldsen, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017).  
                                                          
3 The report is based on 344 crowdfunding, P2P lending and other alternative finance platforms across 45 
European countries. 
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The existing literature on crowdfunding regulation in Europe focuses mainly on 
its legal implication and risks, such as the weaker investor protection and potential for 
fraud, caused by the rapid growth of crowdfunding (Wilson and Testoni, 2014; Boitan, 
2016; Kabai, 2017; Macchiavello, 2018). By analysing the legal reforms promoting 
crowdfunding in six European countries, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) argue that 
when alternative sources of entrepreneurial finance (such as angel capital and venture 
capital) are scarce, a too strong investor protection may harm equity crowdfunding 
investments. Some authors (Wilson and Testoni, 2014; Courtney et al., 2017; Estrin et al., 
2018) conclude that in order to mitigate the previous risks, crowdfunding must be 
approached with caution through specific regulation, and that this is the only workable 
way of helping investors make informed decisions and limiting the amounts they can put 
at risk. Moreover, others authors give suggestions regarding the legal provisions required 
to implement crowdfunding and increase access to capital for start-ups and SMEs (De 
Buysere et al., 2012; Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Juredieu and Mayoux, 2016; Estrin et al., 
2018).   However, little attention is given to the failure to harmonise the regulation, which 
can harm crowdfunding initiatives, and the need to develop a harmonised regulatory 
framework across Europe (European Commission, 2015 and 2018a).  
In this light, this chapter aims to understand how the regulatory fragmentation 
among countries affects the creation of a single crowdfunding market in Europe, and to 
assess the recent proposals coming from a perspective of harmonisation in the European 
market.  
The main research questions are: 
1) How fragmented regulation affects crowdfunding market in Europe? 
2) How should European countries overcome the (regulatory) barriers slowing down 
the harmonisation process? 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter explores in greater detail the 
regulatory frameworks that have emerged in the UK, France, Italy, and Spain as a result 
of the establishment of crowdfunding as a new player in entrepreneurial finance. Then, 
its analysis brings out those aspects that should be avoided and the lessons that should be 
learned from each analysed countries in order to implement the process of regulatory 
harmonisation. From this perspective, this chapter assesses the recent proposal from the 
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European Commission clearly showing the intention to harmonise crowdfunding 
regulation. Moreover, it discusses the role and responsibilities of policymakers and 
regulators in guiding the process of regulatory harmonisation with careful consideration 
of the need, challenges, and risks of not harmonising the regulation as well. The aim is to 
create a European 'Single Market' ensuring equality in regulatory conditions for all 
investors and enterprises and removing potential barriers that prevent platforms activity 
at the trans-European level (European Commission, 2018).  
In conclusion, this analysis presents a number of policy recommendations that 
emphasize the need to improve access to this innovative form of finance for businesses 
in need of funding, particularly start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the legal 
framework in force in the UK, France, Italy and Spain. Section 3 discusses the need for 
harmonisation and the recent proposals from the European Institutions. Section 4 analyses 
the challenges and risks of regulatory fragmentation in Europe. Section 5 concludes. 
 
Need for harmonisation   
 
This section discusses a set of regulatory issues that must be considered with some 
interest by the policymakers to fully understand the extent of regulatory harmonisation 
which is necessary among European member countries. As will be shown in Section 3, 
the current regulatory architecture around crowdfunding in Europe is rather 
heterogeneous (European Commission, 2017). Indeed, some countries have developed a 
specific ecosystem for crowdfunding by enacting bespoke regulatory regimes, also 
relating to the different crowdfunding forms. Instead, other countries are working for 
improve the flexibility and scope of existing regulatory frameworks, fill the shortcomings 
within them, and adjust them in response to the challenges posed by crowdfunding. 
Moreover, the extent of regulation varies according to the different forms of 
crowdfunding. While equity- and lending-based crowdfunding are subject to strict rules, 
with high barriers to entry (Gabison, 2015), in most European countries, crowdfunding 
forms based on donation and reward still remain unregulated.  
In general, the objectives pursued by policymakers at national level are mostly to 
encourage crowdfunding growth by strengthening the internal market integrity and 
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stability in order to facilitate the entry and participation of agents in competitive 
conditions, and at the same time, to minimize information asymmetries and guarantee a 
suitable level of transparency and investors protection. Regulation is one of the important 
tools used to achieve these goals. However, the weakness of the harmonisation ' and 
regulatory cohesion' strategy proposed by the European Institutions, has led to a heavy 
fragmentation in the regulatory frameworks of the Individual Member States, which have 
implemented the European Directives in very different ways (Cumming and Johan, 2013; 
Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017). This fragmented, cluttered and complex regulation 
leads to an unlevel playing field causing market access barriers and hindering the 
implementation of a more aligned Pan-European market in which platforms can easily 
provide their services cross-border. Furthermore, it creates an unpredictable environment 
a state of uncertainty which is deterring investors and, as a consequence, strangles 
investments in crowdfunding (notably the lending and equity-based forms of 
crowdfunding). It is clear that, the failure to harmonise crowdfunding regulation represent 
a prime barrier for its development and limit the effectiveness of efforts made to promote 
it (European Commission, 2017). Therefore, regulatory heterogeneity does not appear to 
be a desirable characteristic of a borderless crowdfunding common market.  
The fundamental objective of the regulatory harmonisation is to achieve 
uniformity in crowdfunding regulation of member states through the definition and share 
of common laws, regulations, standards and practices for crowdfunding actors. The 
removal of regulatory barriers on the European market will allow to create an integrated 
crowdfunding ecosystem which foster transparency and a sound competition among 
market participants, and to ensure a better protection regime and a higher level of 
guarantees for investors thereby helping to restore their confidence in this rapidly 
developing sector (European Commission, 2018a).  
Moreover, the achievement of harmonisation will faster crowdfunding market 
growth, facilitating the emergence of a common global market which is needed to: 
 maximize the growth potential of the crowdfunding market; 
 stimulation of cross-border activity and investment; 
 help platforms to broaden their cross-border outreach by overcoming the internal 
market barriers; 
 increase the level of investor information on the high risks incurred by them; 
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 create a true level playing field for all crowdfunding actors in Europe; 
 enhance European investors' confidence in the crowdfunding market by 
increasing legal certainty as regards the fulfilment of the investor protection rules; 
 ensuring the uniform and effective application of only one set of rules valid 
throughout Europe, in order to prevent distortions of competition between 
individual markets; 
 define tailored rules for equity- and lending-based European crowdfunding 
platforms. 
These needs can only be fulfilled (met) when there is standardized regulation for 
crowdfunding activity which is internationally accepted. 
 
Legal framework in Europe 
 
European countries facing the many legal issues raised by the development of 
alternative financial markets (such as crowdfunding market) are likely to look at other 
countries experiences for guidance on the lessons to learn and the aspects that should be 
avoided.  
For this purpose, the following paragraph provides an in-depth comparative 
analysis of the current crowdfunding regulatory frameworks in force in the UK, France, 
Italy, and Spain. These are summarized in Table 2. 
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Regulation Scope Financial instruments 
Crowdfunding 
service providers 
Authorisation and 
registration 
Maximum offers 
(Prospectus 
exemptions) 
Maximum 
investment limits 
United 
Kingdom 
The FCA’s 
regulatory 
approach to 
crowdfunding 
over the internet, 
and the 
promotion of 
non-readily 
realisable 
securities by 
other media     - 
PS14/4 of March 
2014 
Securities 
and lending 
Equities and debt 
securities, transferable 
and non-transferable. 
Non-readily realisable 
securities (NRRS) only to 
retail investor certified as 
sophisticated investors, 
high net worth investors, 
and advised investors 
Entities authorised 
by the FCA to carry 
out the regulated 
fundraising activities 
in the UK 
Authorisation by 
FCA 
 
Lower than € 5 
million in a period 
of 12 months  
10% of the net 
investable assets for 
non-sophisticated 
investors; No 
investment limit for 
sophisticated 
investors, high-net-
worth investors, and 
retail clients who 
receive an 
investment advisory 
or investment 
management service 
from an authorized 
person 
France Ordonnance n. 
2014-559 du 30 
mai 2014 relative 
au financement 
participatif 
Securities 
and lending 
 
 
 
Since the “Loi Macron” 
preference shares with 
voting rights (ordinary 
shares only previously), 
convertible bonds 
(straight bonds only 
previously), and the 
minibonds 
 
Intermediaire en 
Financement 
Participatif (IFP) 
and Conseiller en 
Investissement 
Participatif (CIP) 
Authorisation by 
AMF  and 
registration in the 
“Registre Unique 
des Intermédiaires 
en Assurance, 
Banque et Finance” 
managed by ORIAS 
€ 2.5 million per 
year per project (€ 1 
million previously) 
No investment limit 
per project and per 
year. Limit of € 
2,000 (€ 5,000 for 
interest-free loan) 
per project and per 
year for lenders 
Table 2. Overview of crowdfunding regulatory frameworks in force in the UK, France, Italy, and Spain. 
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Italy Decreto Legge 
n.179/2012 
(Decreto Crescita 
2.0) and Decreto 
Legge n.3/2015 
(Investment 
Compact) 
Equity Shares or units of small 
and medium-sized 
businesses, social 
enterprises and mutual 
investment bodies or 
other joint stock 
companies that invest 
mainly in small and 
medium-sized businesses 
Entities authorised to 
provide investment 
services and subject 
to MiFID rules (ipso 
iure managers) and 
other legal entities 
authorised ad hoc by 
CONSOB 
Authorisation and 
registration in the 
ordinary section of 
the Register of the 
portals’ managers 
by CONSOB.  Ipso 
iure managers do 
not need 
authorisation but 
must be enrolled in 
the special section 
of the Register  
Lower than € 5 
million per year (€ 
100,000 previously) 
No investment limit. 
Exemption from 
MiFID rules for 
single investment 
less than €500 
(natural persons) or 
€5.000 (legal 
entities) and overall 
investments during a 
year less than €1.000 
(natural persons) or 
€10.000 (legal 
entities) 
Spain Ley 5/2015, de 
27 de Abril, de 
Fomento de la 
Financiación 
Empresarial 
(LFFE) 
Securities 
and 
lending. 
Ordinary and preferential 
shares, bonds, limited 
liability company's shares 
and other transferable 
securities 
Plataformas de 
Financiación 
Participativa, (PFP) 
Authorisation and 
registration by the 
CNMV 
€ 2 million per 
project, per 
platform, in a given 
year. €5 million 
when projects are 
targeted only to 
accredited investors 
No investment limit 
for accredited 
investors. Limit of 
€3.000 per project 
and maximum 
€10.000 per year for 
non-accredited 
investors 
Source: Author elaboration 
26 
 
The United Kingdom   
 
The UK provided for a nimble set of new rules specifically designed for equity-
and lending-based crowdfunding in order to facilitate and promote the development of 
crowdfunding market.  
The new rules introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in March 
2014 (PS14/4) came into force on 1 April 2014 and were then reviewed in February 2015 
and most recently in December 2016 through the publication of a Feedback Statement 
providing 'Interim feedback to the call for input to the post-implementation review of the 
FCA’s crowdfunding rules' (FS16/13).        
According to the regulation of Securities Model under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), both equity-and lending-based platforms are regulated by the 
FCA and they need to be authorized beforehand to carry out the regulated fundraising 
activities in the UK. Moreover, they have to conform to standards set out by the FCA. 
There is no national registry for crowdfunding platforms in the UK. Since the UK, as well 
as Italy, rely upon the self-certification of investors, platforms have to inform investors 
of potential losses and carry out a screening process in order to identify the so called 'non-
sophisticated investors', i.e. retail clients who certify that they will not invest more than 
10% of their investible assets (excluding their principal residence, pension and life cover) 
in unlisted share or debt securities over the 12 months following the investment (FCA, 
2014).  
The FCA allows investing more than 10% of the net investible portfolio in unlisted 
shares to the following categories of investors: 
1) sophisticated investors, i.e. investors who certify to be member of a network or 
syndicate of business angels from at least 6 months, to have made more than one 
investment in an unlisted company in the previous two years, to have worked in 
the previous two years in the private equity sector, or in the provision of finance 
for SMEs, or to have been in the previous two years a director of a company with 
an annual turnover of £1 million or more;  
2) high-net-worth investors, i.e. investors that earn at least £100,000 a year or have 
at least £250,000 in assets, excluding principal residence, insurance and pension 
policies; and  
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3) retail clients who receive an investment advisory or investment management 
service from an authorized person. 
Equity crowdfunding platforms may offer investors equities and debt securities, 
transferable and non-transferable. However, the FSMA restricts the offer of 'non-readily 
realizable securities' (NRRS), i.e. shares or debt securities not listed on the stock markets 
but carrying significant risks, only to retail investor certified as sophisticated investors, 
high net worth investors, and advised investors. Shares in private limited companies 
cannot be offered to the public (Section 755 of the Companies Act 2006). UK platforms 
may offer transferable securities across the European Economic Area (EU passport 
status). Despite the FSMA requires that a prospectus gets published when transferable 
securities are offered to the public, crowdfunding offers of less than €5 million in a period 
of 12 months are exempted from such publication. In order to operate, lending-based 
platforms must have a minimum capital of £50,000 and expose transparent, clear and not 
misleading information about the offered interest rates. Moreover, all risk warnings shall 
be clearly identified to ensure an appropriate level of customers’ protection. 
Regulatory regime for lending-based platforms only apply to loans where either: 
 the borrower is an individual;  
 the loan is GBP 25,000 or less; or 
 the individual is not borrowing for business reasons. 
The UK securities regulation does not apply to donation- and reward-based 
crowdfunding as they do not offer equity stakes or return. Since 2017 the FCA also 
regulates payment services provided in connection with donation and reward. The UK 
Crowdfunding Association (UKCFA), set up as a self-regulatory trade body by several 
UK crowdfunding businesses, published its own code of practice. 
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France 
 
Until 2014, in France there was no specific definition or legal status for 
crowdfunding, whose activity was allowed within the general discipline. For a long time, 
French platforms have been forced to adopt the status of Investment services providers 
(PSI) other than asset management companies, generally adopted by investment 
companies and credit institutions defined in Article L.531-1 of the Monetary and 
Financial Code (Code Monétaire et Financier). On February 14, 2014, the ministry of 
economic affairs and finance announced measures to facilitate crowdfunding that have 
become effective since September 20144. In order to make rules regarding crowdfunding 
more flexible, in 2016 the French regulation has been revised with the entry into force of 
the Law no. 2015-990 dated 6 August 2015, known as 'Loi Macron', by which has been 
given to the web-users the opportunity to invest in projects via new instruments i.e. 
preference shares with voting rights (ordinary shares only previously), convertible bonds 
(straight bonds only previously), and the minibonds. 
French regulation, supervised by the Authority of Financial Markets (AMF-
Autorité des Marchés Financiers) and the National Financial Services Regulator (ACPR-
Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution), has created two specific statuses for 
the Crowdfunding platforms, both subject to anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism 
regulations: 
1. Intermediaire en Financement Participatif (IFP). Issuers offering straight loans 
either interest free or generating interest through crowdfunding platforms must be 
accredited as Investment Intermediary. Since 1 December 2016, portals offering 
funds in the form of donations (with or without rewards) have to be accredited as 
IFP. Platforms registered as IFP are regulated by the ACPR and they must have a 
minimum capital equal to €40,000; 
                                                          
4 The 'Ordonnance n. 2014-559 du 30 mai 2014 relative au financement participatif' provided the basis for 
a regulatory framework applicable to crowdfunding to ensure its development according to secure legal 
conditions and to protect investors and borrowers. The new legal and regulatory framework came into force 
on 1 October 2014. 
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2. Conseiller en Investissement Participatif(CIP). Issuers conducting a securities 
offering (shares or debt instruments) through crowdfunding platforms must be 
accredited as advisor in participative investments. They can also opt for the status 
of Investment Services Provider (PSI-Prestataire de Services d’Investissement). 
Platforms registered as CIP are regulated by the AMF and are subject to different 
obligations. Those registered as PSI, on the other hand, are subject to the joint 
supervision of both the ACPR and the AMF and they must have a share capital of 
€ 50,000 if the platform does not hold securities or customer funds and € 125,000 
if it holds. 
For both CIPs' and PSIs' status, the total offering amount may not exceed, for the 
same issuer, € 2.5 million per year (€ 1 million previously). Law has additionally 
established that in order to qualify as an IFP, CIP or PSI, a platform shall be registered in 
the 'Registre Unique des Intermédiaires en Assurance, Banque et Finance' managed by 
ORIAS5 and subscribe a professional liability insurance policy (this being mandatory as 
from 1 July 2016). They shall also comply with good conduct and organization rules and 
ensure that their clients' interests are protected and that they receive the adequate level of 
information to appreciate the risks associated with their investment. Platforms that respect 
the obligations mentioned above can use the label of 'Plateforme de 
Crowdfunding Régulée par les Autorités Françaises' showing that they have been 
approved by the French authorities6. Concerning the prospectus exemptions7, the offering 
of equity and debt instruments on crowdfunding websites is not considered as a public 
offering (subject to a prospectus) and that’s why the issuance derogates from the 
obligation to produce a prospectus when the project is raising less than € 2.5 million, 
                                                          
5 ORIAS is a French association in charge of a single register of insurance, banking and finance 
intermediaries. 
6 The use of this collective label is reserved for legal entities meeting the following regulatory requirements: 
registration on the French register of insurance, banking and finance intermediaries (ORIAS), as a 
crowdfunding investment advisor (CIP) or a crowdfunding intermediary (IFP); authorization by the ACPR 
to provide an investment advisory service as an investment services provider (PSI) and offer financial 
securities offers through a progressive-access website that meets the characteristics set out in Article 325-
32 of the General Regulation of the Autorité des Marchés Financiers. 
7 See the 'Prospectus Directive' 2010/73/EU on the prospectus to be drawn up, approved and published 
when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market. 
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since 30 October 2016 (€ 1 million previously), calculated over a period of 12 months. 
Beyond this threshold, the obligation to draw up a prospectus for a securities issuer is 
mandatory. Concerning to investors, no limit per project and per year is established by 
the law. However, in lending-based crowdfunding lenders can invest up to € 2,000 (€ 
1,000 previously) per project and per year, when interest is charged on the loan and, up 
to € 5,000 (€ 4,000 previously) per project and per year, when interest is no charged on 
the loan. For IFPs' platforms offering straight loans the total offering amount may not 
exceed € 1 million per project, and lenders can invest up to € 2,000 (€ 1,000 previously) 
per project and per year, when interest are charged on the loan and, up to € 5,000 (€ 4,000 
previously) per project and per year, when interest are no charged on the loan. Platforms 
with the PSI status are empowered to offer the investment services for which they are 
licensed for across the European Economic Area (EU passport status). Foreign platforms 
which operate under the equity or lending crowdfunding model have to be registered in 
France as CIP, PSI or IFP and have to abide by French regulation. Equity crowdfunding 
platforms may offer in France securities of non-French companies, under certain 
conditions.  Since 1 December 2016, donation- and reward-based platforms are subject 
to IFP status. 
 
Italy 
 
Italy gave a very strong signal to its fellow European Member States, being the 
first country to regulate equity crowdfunding in Europe by the Decree Law 179 of 18 
October 2012 (so called Decreto Crescita 2.0) on 'Further urgent measures for Italy’s 
economic growth', converted into Law 221 of 17 December 2012. The long path of 
regulation development ended with the entry into force, on 3 January 2018, of the 
Legislative Decree n.129 dated 3 August 2017, implementing the Directive 2014/65/UE 
(MiFID II) which has further amended the existing rules of the Italian Consolidated 
Financial Act (TUF, Testo Unico della Finanze) on the risk capital fundraising through 
online portals. Under the current Italian law, the fund raising through equity 
crowdfunding platforms is available for: 
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 all SMEs, regardless of their innovative nature8, including those established in the 
form of limited liability companies (in derogation from Article 2468 of the Italian 
Civil Code)9; 
 Collective Investment Undertakings (CIUs) and investment companies that 
mainly invest in SMEs. 
According to Article 50 quinquies (sub-paragraph 2) of TUF, the management of equity 
crowdfunding portals can be carried out by two types of subjects: 
1. 'ipso iure' managers: entities authorized to provide investment services and subject 
to MiFID rules, such as 'investment firms, EU investment companies, companies 
of non-EU countries other than banks authorized in Italy, the managers referred 
to in article 1 (sub-paragraph 1, letter q-bis) of the TUF10, for just the offer of 
stakes or shares of UCI that invest mainly in small and medium-sized businesses 
and banks, authorized to the relative investment services'11; 
2. other legal entities authorized ad hoc by the Italian financial markets regulator 
(CONSOB, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e per la Borsa) and subject to 
MiFID rules only in so far as they are required to transmit investors’ orders for 
the subscription, buying and selling of financial instruments representative of 
capital exclusively to professional brokers (such as banks, investment firms, EU 
                                                          
8 As defined in Article 2 (point 1) of Regulation (EU) n. 2017/1129 dated 14June 2017, Small and Medium-
Sized enterprises’ or ‘SMEs’ are (i) companies, which, according to their last annual or consolidated 
accounts, meet at least two of the following three criteria: an average number of employees during the 
financial year of less than 250, a total balance sheet not exceeding €43 million and an annual net turnover 
not exceeding € 50 million; (ii) small and medium-sized enterprises as defined in point (13) of Article 4(1) 
of Directive 2014/65/EU i.e. the companies that had an average market capitalization of less than EUR 200 
million on the basis of end-year quotes for the previous three calendar years. 
9 At first, the Decree Law 179 restricted the public offer of equity participations through online portals 
solely to the 'Innovative start-ups', as defined in Article 25 of the same Decree Law. With the so called 
'Investment Compact Decree' n. 3 of January 24, 2015, the use of equity crowdfunding was extended also 
to the 'Innovative SMEs.' And then, to all SMEs, through the Law n.232/2016, and also to SMEs established 
in the form of limited liability companies, with the Decree Law n. 50/2017 (Article 57, sub-paragraph 1). 
10 Asset management company, SICAV or SICAF which directly manages its own capital, an EU 
management company, an EU AIFM, a non-EU AIFM, and a EuSEF manager. 
11 Until 2017, only 'banks and others investment undertaking already authorized to provide investment 
services' were listed among the authorized entities. With the Decree Law n. 50 of 24 April 2017, in force 
from January 2018, the category has been significantly extended to all the subjects mentioned above. 
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investment companies and Companies of non-EU countries other than banks) for 
the execution thereof. 
Therefore, as stated by Article 100-ter (sub-paragraph 2-bis) of TUF, 'ipso iure' 
managers, as 'intermediaries qualified for the provision of one or more of the investment 
services provided for in article 1, paragraph 5, letters a), b), c), c-bis and e)'12, are the only 
ones that can subscribe and sell investments shares representing the capital of SMEs and 
of social enterprises incorporated in the form of companies with limited liability, for their 
own account and on behalf of third parties that have taken up the offer of financial 
instruments via online portals. On the contrary, managers in the second category may not 
in any case hold sums of money or financial instruments pertaining to third parties (sub-
paragraph 4, Article 50-quinquies). They must, therefore, transmit the subscription orders 
to the authorized entities in order to make them effective, collecting - in general, seven 
days after the dispatch of the participations purchase order, i.e. at the end of the period 
linked to the revocation right - the corresponding amounts in a tied account destined to 
the issuer held by the authorized entities that receive and complete the orders13. In Italy 
equity crowdfunding is accessible only for financial instruments issued by 'small and 
medium-sized businesses, social enterprises and mutual investment bodies or other joint 
stock companies that invest mainly in small and medium-sized businesses' (Art. 100-ter, 
sub-paragraph 1). At least 5% of the financial instruments offered shall be subscribed (i) 
by professional investors; (ii) banking foundations; (iii) innovative start-ups incubators; 
(iv) investors in support of small and medium-sized enterprises that fulfil certain 
requirements. The rules on solicitation of public savings laid down in Part IV, Title II, 
Chapter I, of the TUF do not apply to above mentioned public offers of financial 
instruments, as long as the overall amount of the offer is lower than €5.000.000 per year, 
as established by CONSOB14 pursuant to article 100, sub-paragraph 1, letter c). In this 
                                                          
12 Investment services above are: (i) dealing for own account, (ii) execution of orders for clients, (iii) 
underwriting and/or placement based on an irrevocable commitment towards the issuer, and (iv) placement 
without irrevocable commitment to issuers. 
13 See Article 25 of CONSOB Regulation. 
14 See Section 34-ter, sub-section 1 c), of CONSOB resolution 14th May 1999, no. 11971 (the 'Issuers 
Regulation'), as amended. 
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case the obligation to publish a prospectus shall not apply. All portals’ managers, other 
than banks and financial intermediaries, have to register with the ordinary section of the 
Register of the portals’ managers, published on the CONSOB website. In order to be 
enrolled on the CONSOB register these portals’ managers must meet a set of capital and 
disclosure requirements (see Article 50 quinquies, sub-paragraph 2 of TUF). Unlike 
portals’ managers enrolled in the ordinary section, the 'ipso iure' managers, being already 
authorized to carry out investment services, are enrolled in a special section of the 
Register of the portals’ managers and they only need to inform CONSOB of their 
intention to start managing an online portal. As said above, MiFID conduct rules apply 
only to 'ipso iure' managers. Thus, CONSOB authority sets forth ad hoc rules that the 
other types of portals’ managers must respect in their relations with investors, 
contemplating a simplified system for professional investors and monitors compliance 
with those rules. Equity crowdfunding regulation in Italy makes distinction between 
Professional Investors, as defined in point (j) of Article 2, and Retail Investors, providing 
for the latter a different protection regime, which depends on the amount they wish to 
invest.  
There are no limits for investors, but in order to reduce the intermediaries’ obligations, 
whilst ensuring an adequate level of investors protection, an exemption from MiFID rules 
is provided for investments 'below threshold' i.e. single investment less than €500 (natural 
persons) or €5.000 (legal entities) and overall investments during a year less than €1.000 
(natural persons) or €10.000 (legal entities). Despite being duly authorized by CONSOB, 
Italian equity crowdfunding platforms cannot directly carry out their activity in other 
European countries. Such activity, in fact, are not subjected to the principle of mutual 
recognition (stemming for Regulation (EC) n. 764/2008), defining rights and obligations 
for public authorities and enterprises that wish to market their products in another EU 
country by ensuring that any product lawfully sold in one EU country can be sold in 
another. Foreign equity Crowdfunding platforms, instead, can directly operate in the 
Italian market with the prior obtainment of the relevant authorization by CONSOB. 
Moreover, foreign platforms which hold a MIFID EU license no need to obtain such 
CONSOB license, since they may perform their activity in Italy through (i) the setting up 
a local branch office, according to the right of freedom of establishment, or (ii) directly 
without any establishment of a local branch office, in accordance with the right of 
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freedom to provide services, or (iii) through an agent established in the Member State in 
which platforms wish to operate. Donation and reward based crowdfunding do not fall 
under the scope of the Italian financial services regulation. As consequence, platforms 
don’t need to be licensed and are not monitored by the CONSOB Authority. Lending 
based crowdfunding (P2P and P2B) has been, instead, recently recognized in Italy 
through the Bank of Italy resolution n.584, published on 9 November 2016 and come into 
force the 1 January 2017, laying down provisions concerning Savings Collection by non-
Banks. In particular, in Section IX of the resolution the lending based crowdfunding are 
defined as 'social lending' i.e. an instrument through which a plurality of subjects can 
request to a plurality of potential lenders, through online platforms, repayable funds 
(bearing interests) for personal or business use. Lending activity is allowed in compliance 
with the rules regulating the activities reserved to special categories of subjects, which 
include, for example and without limitation, banking activity, credit brokerage, payment 
services and savings collection. Platforms that want to carry out the lending activity have 
to apply for the Payment Service Provider (PSP) or Electronic Money Issuer (EMI)license 
granted by the Bank of Italy or ask to passport the license granted by another European 
supervisory authority in the relevant home member state. The Provisions do not set out a 
specific limit to the maximum amount that can be invested and raised through online 
platforms managed by non-bank managers. According to market practice, to date an 
indicative threshold is from €50.000 up to €100.000 of investments per project and from 
€15.000 up to €300.000 of raising per project. No quantitative limits to raising capital 
through online platforms are set out for Banks.  Lending platforms which are allowed by 
Bank of Italy to act as Payment Service Provider (PSP), Electronic Money Issuer (EMI) 
or financial intermediaries can provide payment services in any other European Member 
State, through (i) the setting up a local branch office, according to the right of freedom of 
establishment, or (ii) directly without any establishment of a local branch office, in 
accordance with the right of freedom to provide services, or (iii) through an agent 
established in the Member State in which platforms wish to provide payment services. In 
the same way, foreign PSPs and EMIs, authorized in a European State Member, can 
provide payment services in Italy, without the need to obtain further authorization.  Due 
to the PSD2 implementation, in the last year many lending platforms from other European 
countries established their local platforms in the Italian market. 
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Spain 
In Spain, the Law 5/2015, of 27 April, on the Promotion of Corporate Financing, 
also called 'LFFE' (Ley de Fomento de la Financiación Empresarial), provides a 
regulation for equity and lending crowdfunding investment through the participatory 
financing platforms (Plataformas de Financiación Participativa, or PFP)15 - a new 
category of intermediary in the financial market. Donation and reward based 
crowdfunding is not being regulated in Spain. In this kind of crowdfunding the general 
laws affecting to the VAT or tax allowance apply. The LEFE law also introduces new 
developments in securitization and important changes to the bond issuance mechanism. 
The Spanish regulation, which took effect on April 29, 2015, the day following its 
publication in the Spanish Official Gazette (BOE- Boletín Oficial del Estado), arrives in 
Europe after the Italian one (2013), the French one (2014) and the guidelines of the 
English FCA. According to the article 46, participatory crowdfunding platforms are those 
authorized companies whose activity is to bring investors (individuals or legal entities 
who provide funding in exchange for a monetary compensation) into contact with 
promoters (natural or legal persons who request financing on their own behalf to allocate 
it to a participatory financing project), in a professional manner and through websites or 
other electronic means. This rule shall not apply for platforms seeking funding for 
promoters through donations, sale of goods and services and interest free loans. The 
participatory crowdfunding platforms may offer different instruments (such as bonds, 
ordinary and preferential shares or other securities) and provide a range of ancillary 
services (such as the projects analysis to determine the level of risk for investors and 
advisory services to promoters). Collective financing platforms are under the 
authorization and registration of the CNMV, the Spanish securities market regulator, with 
the participation of the Bank of Spain in the case of lending-based crowdfunding (art.53). 
The special CNMV register is regularly published on the CNMV's website and must 
contain the updated data of the corporate name, Internet domain address and registered 
office of the platform, as well as the identity of the administrators and a list of the partners 
with significant participation (art.54). Companies have to fulfil certain administrative and 
                                                          
15 The draft law was developed at the end of February 2014, as part of the bill to promote SMEs funding, 
in order to respond to Spanish companies’ traditional dependence on bank financing.  
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financial requirements to be allowed to operate as crowdfunding platforms (articles 55 
and 56). Projects may be proposed by natural or legal persons with tax residence or validly 
constituted in Spain or in another Member State of the European Union and (art.67), and 
the amount of funding that can be raised per project through each platform may not exceed 
€ 2 million per year, with the possibility of carry out successive rounds of financing that 
do not exceed the aforementioned amount in annual calculation. Funding amount increase 
up to €5 million when projects are targeted only to accredited investors. In addition, 
promoters cannot have more than one project published simultaneously on one platform 
(art. 68). Taking as example the US and UK legislations, Spain makes a distinction 
between accredited (or professional) investors and non-accredited ones (i.e. retail 
investors). Accredited investors are not subject to any specific investment limits but are 
exposed to greater risks and enjoys lesser protection. Non accredited investors cannot 
invest or commit to invest over €3.000 in the same project managed by the same platform 
or more than €10.000 over a period of twelve months in projects published by the same 
platform (art.82). Spanish law applies to platforms, as well as to promoters and investors, 
operating within Spanish territory including those who are abroad but are offering 
products specifically to residents in Spain, or whose purpose is to advertise, promote 
themselves or otherwise attract customers in Spain (art.47).  
 
Challenges and risks of fragmentation 
 
Crowdfunding industry has expanded over the past decade and its growth in 
Europe is predicted to be extremely strong in the coming years, notably in equity-and 
lending-based forms (European Commission, 2017a). The divergence of regulatory 
approaches to crowdfunding among European countries pose significant risks to the 
growth of the European crowdfunding market that, compared to other major world 
economies, is currently underdeveloped. A recent survey indicates that for the 40% of the 
European crowdfunding platforms, the risks associated with regulatory changes at both 
local and European levels are widely perceived as the greatest concern (Ziegler et al., 
2018). Moreover, evidence suggests that cross-border transactions still represent a 
relatively modest share of overall volumes and this may be partly attributed to differences 
in national regulation which increases transaction costs and hinders crowdfunding service 
37 
 
providers' ability to scale their offering at EU level. Even if there is still no unified 
regulation at European level (Boitan, 2016), policymakers and regulators in different 
countries are currently working hard to promote the use of crowdfunding by enacting new 
or revising existing regulatory frameworks. However, provide a harmonised regulation 
for crowdfunding, tailored to its characteristics and risks, in order to create a European 
Single Market poses a number of challenges, including:  
1. emergence of a streamlined and sound regulatory regime enabling and not stifling 
the crowdfunding market; 
2. adoption of a sympathetic tax system encouraging investors and firms; 
3. removal of cultural barriers concerning the approach to SMEs finance and 
investors' mentality which are still firmly entrenched in many European countries; 
4. identification of linkages with other important policy objectives such as the 
building of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). 
Recognizing the need to establish a harmonised regulatory regime for 
crowdfunding, on 8 March 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a 
Regulation on European Crowdfunding Service Providers (ECSP)16 as well as a proposal 
to amend MiFID II to exclude ECSPs from its obligations17 (European Commission, 
2018b and 2018c). The proposals are part of the European Capital Markets Union 
initiative and the Commission's FinTech Action Plan. 
Key initiatives of the proposed ECSP Regulation include: 
1. the possibility for crowdfunding platforms to apply for the 'European 
Crowdfunding Service Providers' (ECSP) label which would allow them to 
passport their services across Europe according to a single set of rules under the 
authorization and ongoing supervision by ESMA;  
2. all payments for crowdfunding transactions should take place through entities 
authorized under the Payment Services Directive; 
                                                          
16 This new proposal only applies to those crowdfunding services entailing a financial return for investors 
(such as investment and lending based crowdfunding). 
17 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.  
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3. greater protection for European investors through clearer rules on information 
disclosures, an entry knowledge test and a simulation of the ability to bear the 
loss; 
4. stronger supervisory powers by ESMA on crowdfunding service providers and 
the enforcement of sanctions and administrative fines. 
With the introduction of the ECSP passport the current national frameworks will 
not be repealed. However, crowdfunding platforms which wish to provide services in 
more than one EU Member State will have to comply with only the proposed ECSP 
Regulation. In this way, platforms would only be authorized once without the need to ask 
the national approval from time to time. This would determine a reduction of market entry 
costs (regulatory and supervisory costs) for crowdfunding platforms and, at the same 
time, would minimize risks of regulatory arbitrage by ensuring a solid investor protection. 
The proposed Regulation, still awaiting formal adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council, clearly showed the intention to create a European 'Single Market' for 
crowdfunding where the connections between investors and businesses in need of funding 
can easily occur, both national and trans-European level. A further proposal comes from 
the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (European 
Parliament, 2018). The proposal foresees the opportunity to regulate token sales by 
creating new regulations for public initial coin offerings (ICOs). According to a document 
published on 10 August, crowdfunding service providers 'should be permitted to raise 
capital through their platforms using certain cryptocurrencies.'  Supported by a single 
regulation this proposal should facilitate access to finance through crowdfunding and 
provide investors for more cybersecurity and legal protection from risks of fraud.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Crowdfunding is a burgeoning market (more than €7 billion reached in 2017) 
requiring increasingly regulatory attention. There is currently no a single regulation aimed 
at crowdfunding at European level yet, and the regulatory fragmentation is one of the 
biggest obstacles to achieving a more aligned Pan-European crowdfunding market. This 
chapter discusses recent reforms in national regulation concerns improvements to the 
quality of crowdfunding regulation. While this study requires further thinking, it 
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contributes to the ongoing regulatory debate on how to remove obstacles and design an 
appropriate framework for the development of a single crowdfunding market in Europe. 
This simple theoretical framework generates key policy implications by recognizing the 
need, challenges, and risks due to the lack of regulatory harmonisation of crowdfunding. 
A central implication is that, even though the different national regimes may promote and 
stimulate crowdfunding market locally, these are not necessarily compatible with each 
other within a transnational context. European policymakers and regulators, with the 
support of the properly tailored national regulations, should design a single framework 
which reaches across and beyond the borders of the European Union with the objective 
of harnessing the great potential of crowdfunding-driven innovations. In particular, it will 
be necessary to strike a balance between the national potentially conflicting objectives, 
and identify the aspects that should be avoided and the lessons that should be learned 
from each European countries. Only in this way will it be possible to establish an 
innovation-promoting regulatory regime opening new economic opportunities for Europe 
and generating real impact in terms of new business creation. The work done by 
policymakers is thus of the highest importance to strengthen the growth of alternative 
sources of funding - including crowdfunding - and to ensure their access to all Europe's 
companies, notably start-ups and SMEs. Crowdfunding regulatory landscape is changing 
rapidly and further research could assess the impact of the harmonisation process on 
crowdfunding market and its implications from the perspective of investor protection at 
European level. One conclusion that emerges in response to the recent proposal of the 
European Commission is that regulatory harmonisation constitutes the basis for a solid, 
sustainable and inclusive growth of crowdfunding, and of FinTech in general. 
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Chapter 3 
Do tax incentives promote crowdfunding investment in Europe?18 
 
Many European countries offer tax incentive schemes to investors and companies 
in crowdfunding. On one hand, they could be seen as a tool to reduce the system’s 
dependence on banks and increase the availability of credit for start-ups and Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs). On the other hand, there is the counterweight of 
disadvantages that investors may face by investing in crowdfunding (i.e. complex and 
incomplete laws, and weak protection). 
The existing literature on crowdfunding does not take into account the 
effectiveness of such schemes in stimulating this type of investment. This chapter aims 
to fill this gap, by deeply analysing the different tax incentive schemes in force in the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, and by making a comparison amongst 
them. Although all the investigated countries promote crowdfunding investment by 
offering tax incentives, the following study finds evidence that the schemes in force could 
have a greater positive impact on the crowdfunding campaigns’ success, by better 
evaluating the peculiarities related to potential crowdfunding investors and firms that 
might take advantage of them: the more tax incentive schemes are properly designed and 
tailored for crowdfunders, the more investors, start-ups and other firms with low liquidity 
could use crowdfunding as source of funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Co-authored by Battaglia, F. Dipartimento di Studi Aziendali e Quantitativi, Università degli Studi di 
Napoli Parthenope, Naples, Italy 
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Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of tax incentive schemes in promoting domestic and foreign 
investment for both developed and developing countries is widely recognised by the 
existing literature (Cary Brown, 1962; Jorgenson, 1963; Bondolino and Greenbaum, 
2007; Klemm, 2010). 
According to research commissioned by the UK Government (HM Revenue and 
Customs Research Report, 2016), for more than 79% of investors the availability of the 
income tax relief is crucial in their decision to invest into small and high-risk businesses. 
Moreover, in 2016 among UK higher rate taxpayers (i.e. investors that have more than 
£40,000 of investments and, pay an income tax four times higher than the national 
average), IW Capital’s Taxpayer Sentiment Report stated the majority (54%) claimed to 
be willing to invest through the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), which is also used 
for crowdfunding investment. 
Over the past decade, crowdfunding (notably in the equity model) has established 
itself as a new player in the entrepreneurial finance market and its role in the seed and 
early-stage financing of entrepreneurial projects has grown rapidly (Schwienbacher and 
Larralde, 2012; Wilson and Testoni, 2014; Bruton et al., 2015). 
According to the 3rd annual European Alternative Finance Industry Report 
(Ziegler et al., 2018), the European market has grown by 41% in 2016, reaching €7.7 
billion and doubling its volumes from 201519. The United Kingdom still remains the 
largest online alternative finance market, with a market volume in Europe of €5.6 billion, 
followed by France (€443.98 million), Germany (€321.84 million) the Netherlands 
(€194.19 million), Finland (€142.23million), Spain (€130.90million), Italy 
(€127.06million) and Georgia (€102.58million). 
Given the importance of young and innovative entrepreneurial firms for the 
overall economic system (Megginson 2004), many countries around the world have 
implemented tax incentives schemes in order to promote crowdfunding investment.  
At my knowledge, there are no papers investigating the link between tax 
incentives schemes and crowdfunding investment. This study aims to fill this gap, by 
giving a primer on the use of tax incentives in fostering investment oriented towards the 
                                                          
19The report is based on 344 crowdfunding, P2P lending and other alternative finance platforms across 45 European 
countries. 
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four main types of crowdfunding (i.e. donation-based, reward-based, lending, and equity), 
by answering to the following research question: Do tax incentives improve 
crowdfunding investment in European countries? 
Though many European countries have permitted crowdfunding platforms to 
operate, only some of them have set up specific tax incentives to increase investment 
through crowdfunding platforms. Therefore, this analysis focuses on UK, France, Italy, 
Spain and Belgium, because they are currently the only countries adopting ad hoc tax 
incentives in order to improve crowdfunding activity in Europe. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develop the research hypothesis. Section 3 analyses the typology 
of tax incentives which can be used and how they affect tax burdens. Section 4 describes 
tax incentive schemes in force in the analysed countries, by making a comparison among 
them. Section 5 concludes. 
 
Related review and research hypothesis 
The existing literature on crowdfunding focuses on three streams of studies (for 
detailed literature review see Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2015; Bouncken et al., 2015; 
Moritz and Block, 2016; Short et al., 2017). The first one deals with crowdfunding 
regulation, and analyses on one side the legal provisions required to implement 
crowdfunding and to increase access to capital for start-ups and SMEs (Klöhn and 
Hornuf, 2012; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017), and on the other side, the legal 
implication and risks caused by the rapid growth of crowdfunding (Hazen, 2012; Fink, 
2012; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Stemler, 2013; Wroldsen, 2013). The second stream of 
literature focuses on the companies and investors’ motivations for using crowdfunding 
(Ordanini et al., 2011; Hemer et al., 2011; Belleflamme et al., 2010, 2013, 2014; Gerber 
et al., 2012; Hienerth and Riar, 2013; Burtch et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Mollick and 
Kuppuswamy, 2014; Hu et al., 2015; Macht and Weatherston, 2014; Allison et al., 2015; 
Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2018). Authors conclude that 
both investors and companies are not just driven by the financial motive (i.e. the lack of 
liquidity, for businesses, and the financial return on investment, for investors), but also 
by non-financial motivations. In particular, from crowdfunding investors expect more 
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than the economic return on their investment: social reputation growth, self-affirmation, 
fun, and the possibility of support companies or projects in which they believe and 
identify with, are all strong motivations that investors try to satisfy by investing in 
crowdfunding (Ordanini et al., 2011; Hemer et al., 2011; Gerber et al., 2012; Lin et al., 
2014; Allison et al., 2015; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 
2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2018). 
By using crowdfunding, companies can not only fill the equity gap 
(notably in the early stage), but also benefit from better access to customers and 
outside funders (i.e. business angels and venture capital), develop strong 
relationship networks, and obtain feedback for their products or services. In 
addition, companies can adopt crowdfunding to increase visibility and public 
attention and exploit the speed and flexibility of the online funding process 
(Belleflamme et al., 2010, 2013, 2014; Hemer et al., 2011; Gerber et al., 2012; 
Burtch et al., 2014; Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014; Hu et al., 2015; Hienerth 
and Riar, 2013; Macht and Weatherston, 2014). The third and most extensive 
stream of literature analyses the determinants of campaigns success (Ordanini et 
al., 2011; Belleflamme et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; Colombo 
et al., 2015; Cordova et al., 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2015; Koch and 
Siering, 2015; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Kunz et al., 2016; Ralcheva and 
Roosenboom, 2016; Signori and Vismara, 2016; Vulkan et al., 2016; Angerer et 
al., 2017; Vismara, 2016, 2018; Vismara et al. 2016; Block et al., 2018; Günther 
et al., 2018; Polzin et al., 2018). In particular, several of these studies focus on the 
properties of the offer and its funding dynamics, such as the fundraising goal, the 
campaign duration, the retained equity, the number of investors, the presence of 
voting rights or tax incentive schemes, the composition and experience of the top 
management team, and so on (Belleflamme et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014;Ahlers et 
al., 2015; Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016;Signori and Vismara, 2016; Vulkan 
et al., 2016; Vismara, 2016; Vismara et al. 2016). Other empirical studies find that 
a crowdfunding campaigns’ success is positively related to the great flow of 
information that companies provide to investors through video, images, 
comments, and updates (Colombo et al., 2015; Cordova et al., 2015; Koch and 
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Siering, 2015; Kunz et al., 2016; Vismara et al. 2016; Angerer et al., 2017; 
Vismara, 2018; Block et al., 2018). 
A number of studies investigate whether the geographical distance of firms and 
investors affect the funding success of campaigns by reporting the presence of home bias 
for investors (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015; Hornuf and Schmitt, 2016). In crowdfunding 
context, investors are more responsive to the distance and prefer to invest in 
geographically close firms (Burtch et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016; Günther et al., 2018). The recent literature focuses 
mainly on the role played by investors’ and proponents’ social networks in increasing the 
fundraising success probability and in reducing the information asymmetry (Ordanini et 
al., 2011; Mollik, 2014; Colombo et al., 2015; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Vismara, 
2016; Angerer et al., 2017; Polzin et al., 2018). Currently, there are no papers, analysing 
the success factors of crowdfunding campaigns, dealing with the effect of tax incentives 
on crowdfunding investment. 
In a very recent study, Estrin et al. (2018), following the ‘Gioia Methodology’ 
(Gioia et al., 2012), find that on the investors’ side, tax breaks represent one of the ‘first-
order’ reasons for investing in equity crowdfunding. By analysing the determinants of 
funding success in a sample of projects listed on the UK equity platforms, some authors 
include in the control variable sets the United Kingdom Investment Schemes (i.e. SEIS 
and EIS), which are designed to encourage seed investment in early-stage companies 
(Vismara 2016, 2018 and 2018a; Vulkan, 2016; Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016; 
Signori e Vismara, 2016 and 2018). However, these studies dealing with the impact of 
tax incentives on crowdfunding, bring mixed results. In particular, Vismara (2016, 2018 
and 2018a) finds that tax incentives are not significant in attracting early investors and do 
not impact the probability of the offerings being successful, even if they do attract 
professional investors. On the contrary, Signori and Vismara (2016 and 2018) show that 
being eligible for tax incentives matter, confirming the success of tax policies designed 
to stimulate investments in early-stage companies. Indeed, as found by these two scholars, 
firms that benefit from the tax incentive face not only a higher likelihood of a successful 
outcome (Signori e Vismara, 2018), but are also more likely to succeed in raising 
additional capital in follow-on offerings and less likely to fail in a post-campaign scenario 
(Signori e Vismara, 2016). Finally, Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016, observe that 
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successful campaigns often have tax breaks, but companies that do not offer tax breaks 
to investors do not experience lower funding success. These studies belong to the stream 
of literature dealing with the effects (i.e. benefits and risks) of tax incentives on 
investment in both developed and developing countries (Shah, 1995; Aernoudt, 1999; 
Christofidis and Debande, 2001; Wells et al., 2001; Easson and Zolt, 2002; Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen, 2002 and 2004; Lipper and Sommer, 2002; Zee et al., 2002; Cowling et al., 
2008; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Zelekha and Sharabi, 2012; Brodzka, 2013; 
Cumming and Li, 2013; Wilson and Silva, 2013; Wilson, 2015; Munongo et al., 2017; 
Kinda, 2018). In particular, the most recent studies on the topic focus on the role and 
importance of tax incentives as part of a broader set of policy tools used to encourage 
forms of entrepreneurial finance such as business angel (Aernoudt, 1999; Lipper and 
Sommer, 2002) and venture capital (Christofidis and Debande, 2001; Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2002 and 2004; Cowling et al., 2008; Cumming and Li, 2013). A recent report 
of the European Commission (2017) states that tax incentives for venture capital and 
business angels' investment significantly influence investment decisions by reducing the 
effective marginal cost of investing in smaller companies. According to this, in taking the 
initial investment decision, an investor should be willing to provide more capital through 
business angels or venture capital funds which benefit from tax incentives, rather than 
through those not benefitting for them. Then, the report concludes that targeted and 
properly-designed tax incentives may help to correct some market imperfections or 
distortions such as moral hazard and information asymmetry. A growing body of 
literature discusses the controversial use of tax incentives in developing countries 
(Brodzka, 2013; Munongo et al., 2017). In particular, while some authors emphasize the 
positive impact of tax incentives in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
strengthening the competitive position of developing countries (Shah, 1995; OECD, 
2001; Zee et al., 2002; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012), others authors stress the risks and 
costs related to them (Wells et al., 2001; Easson and Zolt, 2002; Zee et al., 2002; Zelekha 
and Sharabi, 2012; Kinda, 2018). For instance, Easson and Zolt (2002) argue that tax 
incentives are the source of two kinds of revenue losses. First, tax incentives discourage 
other investments in favor of the incentive-receiving projects. Second, tax incentives give 
businesses the opportunity to shift income from taxable activities to those that fall under 
tax incentives by improperly claiming the incentives and thereby avoiding tax. Moreover, 
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authors find that tax incentives encourage the governments' corruption by giving the 
authorities discretionary power to determine which projects qualify for incentives and 
which do not. Recent evidence on 30 African countries suggests that these countries 
should avoid using costly tax incentives and pay more attention to the infrastructure, 
finance, institutions, and human capital, which are the key aspects of their economy’s 
investment climate (Kinda, 2018).  
Despite many theoretical and empirical studies, which analyse the impact of tax 
incentives on investment, none of them focus on the crowdfunding investments. This 
study aims to extend the existing literature on factors affecting success of crowdfunding 
campaigns, by giving a primer on the use of tax incentives in fostering investment 
oriented towards crowdfunding in Europe. Consistent with the previous literature review 
and its findings, it aims to investigate the effectiveness of tax incentives on increasing 
investment within crowdfunding, by answering the following question: Do tax incentives 
improve crowdfunding investment? 
More specifically, the different tax incentive schemes in force in the UK, France, 
Italy, Spain, and Belgium are considered in detail on the following pages, in order to 
understand their role in stimulating crowdfunding development. 
 
Typology of Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives can be defined as special tax provisions drawn up by governments 
to provide a more favorable tax treatment to certain activities, investment projects, or 
taxpayers, compared to the provisions applicable in general (i.e. those that do not receive 
a special tax provision) (Klemm, 2010). These special provisions can take multiple forms 
and typically offer investors some combination of tax deductions through investment 
allowances or tax credits, temporary exemptions on corporate taxes (tax holidays), 
reduction of capital gains taxes for investors in start-ups, preferential rates, relief on 
income generated over the life of the investment, relief on gains realised upon disposal of 
the investment, provisions for carry forward of capital gains or losses, and so on. How 
these incentives work and the reasons for their use vary considerably from country to 
country. The most common tax incentives are the following:  
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1) tax holidays are directed to new firms or investments and allow for a temporary 
exemption from certain specified taxes, typically income tax, which may be total or 
partial (i.e. with a rate that is below the regular rate for qualified investment projects). 
They may be granted to particular activities or to particular taxpayers. Of all the 
different forms of tax incentives available, tax holidays are most popular among 
developing and transitioning countries, but rarely found in developed countries; 
2) investment allowances are a form of tax relief on the basis of which a specified 
percentage of the initial costs on qualifying investments can be deduced from taxable 
income, in addition to the normal allowable depreciation on the full costs of such 
investments. Investment allowances aim to encourage capital investment, and they 
differ from investment tax credits which allows taxpayers to deduct investment costs 
directly from their tax liability; 
3) investment tax credits are a form of tax relief structured to encourage economic 
growth by allowing investors to reduce the amount of taxes to be paid. In particular, 
investors may deduct a certain fraction of investment costs directly from their tax 
liability, in the current fiscal year or in a later year (tax carryforward). Being 
equivalent forms of tax incentives, investment tax credits and investment allowances 
share the same advantages; 
4) reduced tax rates provide a reduction of the ordinary rates of tax charged under various 
tax laws for qualified investment projects, qualified investors, and certain types of 
firms such as start-ups and SMEs. Reduced tax rates may occur on income, profits, 
sales, or assets, and they can be a one-time rebate, a reduction in the overall rate, or a 
tax credit. Unlike tax holidays, the tax liability of firms is not entirely eliminated, but 
only reduced; 
5) the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are limited areas that are subject to unique 
economic regulations, designated by the trade and commerce administrations of 
various countries to encourage economic activity and the FDI flows by leveraging tax 
incentives. In particular, companies that conduct their business in a SEZ typically 
receive a total or partial tax exemption and the opportunity to pay lower tariffs. The 
taxation rules are determined by each country and represent a heavily debated 
argument; 
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6) tax exemptions reduce the amount of the taxable income by relieving the taxpayer of 
any tax obligation to submit taxes on the tax-exempt transaction or income. Not to be 
confused with the tax deductions, which reduce (but don't remove) the tax obligation; 
7) financing incentives are benefits given to customers or companies, to encourage them 
to do actions (typically invest) they normally wouldn’t, by reducing the tax rates 
applicable to investors. 
 
Tax incentives to promote crowdfunding investment 
 
In recent years, crowdfunding has emerged as an effective funding channel for 
start-ups and new ventures in addition to traditional channels such as venture capital or 
angel investors. However, seed and early stage funding are extremely risky and investors 
have to face the uncertainties that permeates investment projects, often without adequate 
level of protection. In light of the potential role to be played by crowdfunding in the early 
stage market, policy makers have drawn up tax incentive schemes to promote investment 
in crowdfunding. A number of specific schemes already exists in Europe, and many 
European countries are evaluating their implementation. The following subsections 
provides a detailed description of the tax incentive schemes in force in the UK, France, 
Italy, Spain and Belgium (the countries with the best systems of tax incentives in 
Europe20). These are summarised in Table 3. 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Some tax deductions are available for natural persons who acquire shares in SMEs in Sweden. No specific 
tax reliefs are providing for crowdfunding in Finland and Netherlands. In Germany tax incentives are very 
limited and mainly comprise pre-investment and investment allowances for certain start-ups and SMEs. No 
tax reliefs are available for investments made through crowdfunding platforms. Only with regard to 
donation crowdfunding, if the entity behind the project is a non-profit organization, donations up to 20% 
of the annual income can be claimed as tax exempt (donations over 20% can be carried into the next fiscal 
year). 
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Table 3. 
 
 
 
Overview of tax incentive schemes in force in UK, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium. 
Country 
 
Incentive Scheme 
 
Benefits 
UK 
 
Equity Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Lending Crowdfunding: 
 
 Innovative Finance ISA Scheme (IFISA) 
 
 
 
 
Donation Crowdfunding: 
 
 Gift Aid Scheme 
 
 deduction from the Income Tax up to 30% of the invested amount if the 
acquired shares are held at least for 3 years; 
 exemption from the Inheritance Tax, if investor holds the acquired shares at 
least for 2 years, and from the Capital Gains Tax if investor holds the 
acquired shares at least for 3 years; 
 deferment up to 50% of the Capital Gains Tax on gains realised on the 
disposal of any asset, provided that these gains are reinvested in an EIS 
eligible company; 
 tax relief from investment losses. 
 
 
 income tax relief of 50% on investments up to £100,000 per tax year; 
 relief up to 50% on the Capital Gain Tax, with a maximum of £50,000, for 
capital gains realised and reinvested through EIS eligible companies in the 
same tax year; 
 income tax relief up to 80% of the investment if the company fail 
 exemption from the Capital Gains Tax for any gain arising on the disposal 
of the shares, if these are held at least for 3 years. 
 
 
 tax free interest and capital gains on money lend through FCA-regulated 
and approved P2P crowdfunding platforms, up to the limit of £20,000 for 
2017/18 financial year; 
 lenders can offset the losses they suffer on the unpaid loans against the 
interest they receive on other P2P loans before the income is taxed. 
 
 
 
 
 charities can claim back 25 p for every £1 donated by a UK taxpayer. 
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France 
 
 
Equity Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 “Madelin” tax reductions 
 
 
 
 stock Saving Plan (PEA/PEA-PME) 
 
 
 
 The "Niche Copé" 
 
 
 
 
Lending Crowdfunding: 
 
 losses allocation system 
 
 
 
 
 
Donation Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 deduction from the income tax of 25% of the amounts invested directly or 
indirectly (through a holding company) in the capital of unlisted French 
and European SMEs. 
 
 
 tax exemption on dividends and capital gains on French and European 
SMEs' securities, held for a minimum duration of 5 years. 
 
 
 exemption from the Corporate Tax of 88% of capital gains received by 
natural or legal persons, in the case of sale of their subsidiaries or equity 
securities held for more than two years. 
 
 
 
 lenders can impute the capital losses on unrepaid loans on interest 
generated by other loans granted during the same year or in the 5 years 
following. 
 
 
 
 
 deduction from the Income tax of 66% of the donated amount, for natural 
persons; 
 
 deduction from the Corporate Tax of 60% of the donated amount, for legal 
persons; 
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Italy 
Equity Crowdfunding: 
 
 deduction from the Income Tax of 30% of the invested amount, for natural 
persons; 
 credit on the Corporate Tax of 30% of the invested amount, for legal 
persons. 
Spain 
Equity Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 
Donation Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 deduction from the Income Tax of 20% of the amount invested in Spanish 
companies that are less than three years old; 
 regional income tax relief. 
 
 
 
 deduction from the Income Tax of 75% of the donated amount, for natural 
persons;  
 deduction from the Corporate Tax rate of 35% of the donated amount, for 
legal persons. 
 
Belgium 
 
Equity Crowdfunding: 
 
 Tax shelter for investments in start-ups 
 
 
 
 
 
Lending Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 
Donation Crowdfunding: 
 
 
 
 
 reduction from the Income Tax of 30% of the sum invested in SMEs;  
 
 reduction from the Income Tax of 45% of the sum invested in micro-
enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 tax exemption on interests produced by loans provided to startups through 
regulated crowdfunding platforms. 
 
 
 
 Belgians can recover annually between 40% and 50% of their donation in 
charity which may not exceed 10% of their total net income. 
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The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has some of the best tax relief schemes in the world. These 
schemes help UK SMEs and social enterprises to improve their liquidity and offer investors the 
opportunity to obtain tax reliefs on buying, and holding for a specific period, new shares, bonds, 
or assets. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) provides and monitors on the 
application of four Tax Reliefs Schemes, also known as tax advantaged venture capital 
schemes21 (i.e. EIS, SEIS, SITR and VCT). Crowdfunding through equity offers companies and 
investors the possibility to claim and keep the EIS and SEIS Tax Schemes22, as long as the 
company in which they have invested respects the scheme rules for at least 3 years after the 
investment is made. Otherwise, tax reliefs will be withheld or withdrawn from investors. Due 
to equity investments longer term and higher risk nature, the tax incentives for equity 
investments are very generous. Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending crowdfunding also give lenders the 
opportunity to get tax reliefs through the Innovative Finance ISA Scheme (IFISA). Donations 
made through a crowdfunding platform are generally not tax deductible for donors unless the 
project has been started by a qualified charity and not an individual, in which case, donors can 
use the Gift Aid scheme to deduct the invested amount. No tax reliefs are available for reward 
crowdfunding. A description of the aforementioned tax schemes is given below. 
 
Equity crowdfunding tax relief: EIS and SEIS schemes 
The Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) was introduced in 1994 to encourage 
investment into unlisted companies. This scheme allows growth companies to raise up to £5 
million each year, with a maximum of £12 million in a company’s lifetime (including the 
amounts received from other venture capital schemes and state aid approved under the risk 
finance guidelines)23. 
In order to benefit from an EIS scheme, companies have to fulfil the following 
characteristics: 
                                                          
21 Government of the United Kingdom (UK Government website). 2017. ‘Business Tax: Investment schemes’. 
HM Revenue & Customs, Available at https://www.gov.uk/topic/business-tax/investment-schemes. 
22 SITR and VCT Schemes are available for Social enterprises and VCTs companies, respectively. 
23 Government of the United Kingdom (UK Government website). 2016. ‘Use the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) to raise money for your company’. HM Revenue & Customs, Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/venture-capital-schemes-apply-for-the-enterprise-investment-scheme#how-the-
scheme-works. 
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1) company can receive investment under EIS scheme only within the first seven years from 
its first commercial sale. If a company has any subsidiaries, former subsidiaries, or it has 
acquired other companies, the date of the first commercial sale of the first company in the 
group is considered;  
2) cannot be listed on a stock exchange; 
3) has to be established in the UK; 
4) cannot control another company other than qualifying subsidiaries24; 
5) cannot be controlled by another company and more than 50% of its shares cannot be owned 
by another company; 
6) company and any qualifying subsidiaries must have less than £15 million of gross assets 
before any shares are issued and not more than £16 million immediately afterwards; 
7) company and any qualifying subsidiaries must have fewer than 250 full-time equivalent 
employees at the time the shares are issued. 
The money raised by the new share issue must be used for a qualifying business 
activity25 and must be spent within two years of the investment, or if later, the date the company 
began operations. In addition, the raised money can only be used to grow or develop the 
company business and cannot be used to buy all or part of another business, in any 
circumstances.  
Knowledge-intensive companies that carry out a significant amount of research, 
development and innovation can raise more than £12 million in the company’s lifetime as long 
as (i) the raised money is being used to enter a completely new product market or a new 
geographic market; (ii) the claimed money is at least 50% of the company’s average annual 
revenue for the last five years; (iii) company didn't receive investment (under EIS, SEIS, SITR, 
VCT or state aid approved under the risk finance guidelines), within seven years of its first 
commercial sale. The shares for EIS investments must be paid in full with cash, at the time of 
issue and must be full risk ordinary shares (i.e. not redeemable and without special rights to 
company assets). In addition, shares can have limited preferential rights to dividends. 
                                                          
24 All companies owned or controlled by the company receiving investment under EIS scheme have to be 
‘Qualifying subsidiary companies’. This means that company must own more than 50% of the subsidiary’s shares 
and no one other than company or one of its other qualifying subsidiaries can control this qualifying subsidiary 
company. 
 
25 Qualifying business activity means an existing qualifying trade or which must start within two years of the 
investment; a research and development activity that’s expected to lead to a qualifying trade. 
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The shares issuance cannot be accompanied by an arrangement which (i) guarantee the 
investment or protect the investor from risk; or (ii) allows investors to sell the shares at end or 
during the investment period; or (iii) leaves investor’s benefit from the EIS in a way that’s not 
been intended; or (iv) an arrangement authorising investors to raise money for the purpose of 
tax avoidance; or (v) a reciprocal agreement  in which companies invest back in an investor’s 
company to also gain tax relief. 
EIS allows sophisticated investors to deduct up to 30% of the invested amount from 
their income tax, as long as the acquired shares are held at least for three years. Investors can 
carry back part of the EIS tax relief to the tax year preceding the investment. However, the 
deduction is limited to a maximum investment of £1 million for a single person and £2 million 
for a couple in a tax year and investors will be bound into the scheme for a minimum of three 
years. EIS is exempt from inheritance tax if investor holds the acquired shares for a minimum 
of two years, and from capital gains tax if investor holds the acquired shares for a minimum of 
three years. Investors can defer up to 50% of the capital gains tax on gains realised on the 
disposal of any asset, provided that these gains are reinvested in an EIS eligible company. 
Moreover, investors can obtain a tax relief from investment losses when the shares of the EIS 
company are disposed at a loss, and such losses can be used to offset the investors' capital gains 
or income tax in the year of disposal or the previous year. Currently there is no minimum 
investment requirement for EIS investments (until 6 April 2012 a minimum investment of £500 
was required). 
The Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) was introduced in 2012 to encourage 
investments in seed-stage companies by offering tax reliefs at a higher rate than those offered 
by the existing EIS26. This scheme provides for: 
1) a reduction of 50% of the invested amount on the income tax liability, but not more than 
the maximum figure of £100,000 of the investments per tax year. Investors can carry back 
part of the SEIS tax relief to the previous tax year; 
2) a relief up to 50% on capital gains tax, with a maximum of £50,000, in respect of capital 
gains realised and reinvested through EIS eligible companies in the same tax year; 
3) in case of company fail, investors can claim up to 80% of the investment as tax relief against 
their income tax liability; 
                                                          
26 Government of the United Kingdom (UK Government website). 2017. ‘Venture capital schemes: apply to use 
the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme’. HM Revenue & Customs, Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/venture-capital-schemes-apply-to-use-the-seed-enterprise-investment-scheme. 
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4) an exemption from capital gains tax for any gain arising on the disposal of the shares, if 
these are held for a minimum of three years. 
There is no minimum investment requirement for SEIS investments and investors 
cannot be employees of the company. SEIS relief can be claimed up to five years after the 31st 
of January in the year which the investment was made; the maximum amount that can be 
collected through SEIS investments is £150,000 per year, including any other state aid received 
in the three years up to the date of the investment. Moreover, SEIS tax relief applies only under 
the following conditions: 
1) company has to be established in the UK and carry out a new qualifying trade27; 
2) companies must have 25 or less employees and gross assets of up to £200,000 at the time 
of the share issue – including the group’s employees and assets if company has subsidiaries;  
3) companies cannot be listed on the stock exchange, and cannot have (with their subsidiaries) 
an arrangement to become listed at the time of the share issue;  
4) company cannot control another company other than qualifying subsidiaries; 
5) companies shall be incorporated for less than two years; 
6) an individual’s stake in the company can be no more than 30%;  
7) companies and their subsidiaries may not be members of a partnership; 
8) companies cannot have previously raised funds from other EIS investors or from a venture 
capital trust.  
The raised money must be spent within three years from share issue and can be only 
used on the qualifying business activity for which it was raised. The investment cannot be used 
to buy shares, other than in a qualifying 90% subsidiary which uses that money for a qualifying 
business activity. Shares issued for SEIS investments have to fulfil the same requirements 
provided for shares issued under EIS. 
Peer-to-peer lending crowdfunding tax relief: IFISA tax scheme 
Since April 1999, the UK Government has offered the Individual Savings Accounts 
(ISAs) in order to promote a higher propensity to save by low and medium income families. 
The ISAs are tax-exempt savings accounts allowing individuals aged 18 or over who are 
resident and ordinarily resident in the UK to invest in cash, stocks or shares, and life insurance, 
                                                          
27 New qualifying trade means a trade that must not have been carried out for more than two years by the company 
or any other person who then transferred it to the company. Moreover, the company, or any qualifying subsidiary, 
must not have carried on any other trade before started the new trade. 
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with an investment limit of £20,000 for the 2017/18 tax year, per person28. ISAs are exempt 
from income tax and capital gains tax on the investment returns and investors also do not pay 
tax on money withdrawn from their ISA. In April 2016, the UK Government introduced the 
Innovative Finance ISA (IFISA), which allows residents of the United Kingdom to use some 
(or all) of their annual Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) to lend money through Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA)-regulated and approved P2P platforms. IFISAs also receive tax free 
interest and capital gains on their investments up to the limit of £20,000 for 2017/18 financial 
year29. The limit is set by the UK Government on an annual basis and investors cannot roll over 
their investment allowance into the following tax year. Lending products eligible for the IFISA 
include bonds and revenue based loans - i.e. personal loans, small business loans and property 
loans. Lenders can offset the losses they suffer on the unpaid loans against the interest they 
receive on other P2P loans before the income is taxed. Tax relief allows a 12-month carry back 
and applies only if there is no reasonable possibility of the P2P loan being repaid, and doesn’t 
apply to late payment. If the borrower manages to pay the loan at a later date, or if there is 
recovery of assets, and the lender has already received the tax relief for a bad debt, the amount 
is treated as new P2P income of the lender. To obtain the tax relief on a bad debt, the lender 
must be subject to UK income tax on their P2P income and loan shall take place on P2P lending 
platforms that are authorised by the FCA. P2P loans through crowdfunding platforms are not 
currently protected by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS).  
 
Donation crowdfunding tax relief: Gift Aid scheme 
Gift Aid is a government tax relief scheme that allows charities to claim back the basic 
rate of tax already paid on every eligible donation by the donor, since donations are exempt 
from tax30. More in detail, charities can claim back from HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) 25 
p for every £1 donated by a UK taxpayer (VAT and Council Tax do not apply), increasing the 
donation value by 25%. 
The following are not eligible for Gift Aid: 
                                                          
28 The government provides Junior ISAs for UK resident children under the age of 18 who do not have a Child 
Trust Fund account. Junior ISAs are tax advantaged and have many features in common with ISAs. The annual 
subscription limit for Junior ISAs for 2017/18 is of £4,128. 
 
29 See Innovative Finance ISA. 2017. ‘The Innovative Finance ISA Explained’. Available at 
https://innovativefinanceisa.org.uk/innovative-finance-isa-explained. 
 
30 Government of the United Kingdom (UK Government website). 2018. ‘Claiming Gift Aid as a charity or CASC’. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/claim-gift-aid. 
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1) donations from non-UK taxpayers;  
2) donations which are not 'freewill' gifts but are made in return of something such as tickets 
(raffles, events and auctions) or goods and services (including ‘experience’ days); 
3) donations made on behalf of third parties – a person, group of people, or company. This is 
because the HMRC needs to know the details of the person actually contributing the funds 
and, as a consequence, a Gift Aid declaration can only be made on the taxpayer’s personal 
status; 
4) donations to a family member who's taking part in an event when the charity is contributing 
to the cost. 
 
France 
 
Recognising the importance of crowdfunding, France supports the financing of French 
companies providing tax benefits for investments in SMEs. Individuals and professionals 
whose income is taxable in France are eligible for the following tax reliefs31: 
1) income tax reduction (IR): all those who are liable for income tax (IR-Impôt sur le revenu) 
are allowed to deduct 25% (18% previously) of the amounts invested directly or indirectly 
(through a holding company) in the capital of unlisted French and European SMEs. To 
benefit from the tax deduction, the shares must be held for a minimum of five years and the 
subscription must take place by 31 December of the current fiscal year. The tax benefit is 
limited to € 50,000 (with a maximum tax reduction of € 12,500) for a single person and € 
100,000 for a couple (with a maximum tax reduction of € 25,000). Investments in excess of 
the annual limit gives the right to receive, under the same conditions, the tax reduction in 
the following four years (right to carry forward). This reduction cannot be combined with 
that of the solidarity wealth tax (ISF-Impôt de solidarité sur la fortune). Moreover, 
depending on the holding period of the securities, a tax reduction is possible on the capital 
gain resulting from the sale of these securities. For a detention period of one to four years, 
up to 50% of reduction is possible, 65% from four to eight years and 85% after eight years. 
The tax relief benefit is reserved for natural persons who have their tax domicile in France; 
                                                          
31 See the Law Madelin n° 94-126 du 11 février 1994 relative à l'initiative et à l'entreprise individuelle, Law n° 
2007-1223 du 21 août 2007 en faveur du travail, de l'emploi et du pouvoir d'achat also known as Law ‘TEPA’ and 
Law n° 2017-1837 du 30 décembre 2017 de finances pour 2018. 
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2) solidarity wealth tax reduction (ISF): before 31 December 2017 all those required to pay 
the ISF were allowed, under certain conditions, a reduction of 50% of the amounts invested 
directly or indirectly (through a holding company) in the capital of unlisted French and 
European SMEs. However, with the recent reform of the Financial Law in 2018, the 
solidarity wealth tax has been transformed into the property wealth tax (IFI-Impôt sur la 
fortune immobilière). The IFI tax is levied only on property values (primary and secondary 
residences, rental properties, and so on) excluding securities (stocks, bonds, life insurance, 
savings products, and so on). Therefore, since 1 January 2018, the ISF tax reduction is no 
longer in force; 
3) stock saving plan (PEA/PEA-PME)32: natural persons who have their tax domicile in France 
can buy a portfolio of shares of French and European SMEs and mid-caps, with the 
possibility to benefit from a tax exemption on dividends and capital gains if securities are 
held for a minimum duration of five years. The maximum amount is €150,000 for a single 
taxpayer, and €300,000 for a common taxation. The profits tax depends then on the year of 
securities divestment. Before five years, the tax will be 22.5%, 19% between five and eight 
years and, 0% after eight years. In this case the capital gain must be however reinvested in 
the PEA. The classic PEA (Le Plan d’Epargne en Actions), allows investing in listed and 
unlisted companies. The PEA-PME, allows investment only in unlisted companies. These 
benefits cannot be combined with those on the IR or the ISF. 
Companies can benefit from the system of taxation applicable in the case of parent 
companies and subsidiaries (régime des mères et filiales) for securities held at least eight years. 
If the parent company holds at least 5% of the subsidiary company, two years of detention is 
then sufficient to benefit from the tax exemption (the ‘Niche Copé’). The ‘Niche Copé’ is an 
exemption of 88% from corporate tax on capital gains received by natural or legal persons, 
especially holding companies, in the case of sale of their subsidiaries or equity securities held 
for more than two years. 
Donation based crowdfunding also gives investors (individuals and enterprises) the 
opportunity to obtain tax benefits if and only if the project promoters are organizations that 
work in the common interest, foundations and associations recognized as being of public utility. 
Only in this case, the project promoter will send to investors a tax receipt to be attached to their 
tax return. Investors will benefit from the deduction in force, currently 66% of contribution, if 
                                                          
32 Décret d'application du PEA-PME en date du 4 mars 2014; Règlement (CE) N. 800/2008 de la commission du 
6 Août 2008 ; Communiqué de presse du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances N°1169. 
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investor is an individual, up to 20% of taxable income (60% of contribution up to 0.5% of 
annual turnover if investor is an enterprise). The rate of the tax reduction is increased to 75% 
(up to a limit of € 530) for investments made to non-profit organizations that provide free meals 
to people in need, who help to promote their housing or who are primarily responsible for the 
free provision of care. Investments in rewards based crowdfunding provides tax reduction if 
reward has a value less than 25% of the investment amount and have a value less than € 60. If 
these conditions are not met, the investment does not give rise to a tax benefit. 
To promote the development of lending-based crowdfunding, French regulation has 
provided for losses allocation system. In particular, Article 25 of the Law 2015-1786 of 29 
December 2015 of the Amending Finance Act for 2015, allows lenders to offset the capital 
losses incurred in the event of non-repayment of loans granted since 1 January 2016, through 
crowdfunding platforms, against the interest generated by other loans granted during the same 
year or in the subsequent five years (CGI art. 125-00 A). Article 44 of the Law 2016-1918 of 
29 December 2016 of the Amending Finance Act for 2016 extended the benefit of this losses 
allocation system to the Mini-bonds subscribed from 1 January 2017 up to € 8,000 during the 
same year. 
 
Italy 
 
The Italian tax regulators provide tax benefits for investments through equity 
crowdfunding platforms. The benefits were recently increased by the Budget Law that went 
into effect on 1 January 2018. In detail33, natural persons can benefit from a tax deduction on 
income tax (IRPEF- Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche) of 30% (19% previously) of the 
invested amount. The deduction is limited to €1 million (€ 500,000 previously) per year. In the 
same way, legal entities can obtain a tax credit on corporate tax (IRES- Imposta sul reddito 
delle società) of 30% (20% previously) of the invested amount up to a maximum of €1.8 million 
per year. Tax reductions apply for direct investments made through SMEs and social 
enterprises, and also for indirect investments made through mutual investment bodies or other 
joint stock companies that invest mainly in small and medium-sized businesses.  
                                                          
33 See Article 29, sub-paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5, of Law Decree no. 179 dated 18 October 2012 and subsequent 
amendments. 
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To benefit from the tax deduction, the participation instruments must be held for a 
minimum of three years (two years previously) and must submit as part of the tax filing a set of 
documents and certifications, which include:  
1) the certification attesting the compliance with the maximum limits for contributions in 
relation to the tax period in which the investment was made; and 
2) the company investment plan, containing detailed information on the subject of its activity, 
on the products and on the current or expected performance of sales and profits. 
Law n.205 of the 27 December 2017 (2018 Budget Law) regulates the P2P lending by 
including income from loans granted through P2P lending platforms within the incomes from 
capital34. It states that such platforms must be managed by payment institutions or by companies 
authorized by the Bank of Italy, according to Article 106 of the Consolidated Law on Banking 
(TUB – Testo Unico Bancario). For non-professional lenders, the income from P2P lending is 
subject to a 26% withholding tax to be levied by the authorised platforms' managers35. 
It was recently proposed to include P2P lending, originated through crowdfunding 
platforms, within the eligible investments for the Individual Long-term Savings Plans (PIR), 
thus taking advantage of the related tax incentives (pursuant to Article 1, sub-paragraph 89, 
letter b-bis of the Law 232/2016). This proposal is similar to what was implemented by the UK 
legislator about two years ago with the introduction of Innovative Finance ISAs (Individual 
Savings Accounts) - the equivalent of Italian PIRs. The potential inclusion of P2P lending in 
the PIRs will require in-depth analysis and the organization of special products to be 
implemented and will not occur quickly. In the UK, no material effects have been seen, although 
the ‘IFISA’ was approved in April 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 See the new letter d-bis) inserted in the Article 44, sub-paragraph 1, of the Consolidated Income Tax Act (TUIR). 
 
35 Previously was subject to the marginal rate applied on personal incomes. 
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Spain 
 
Spain regulation makes available some very generous tax breaks to investors36. 
Investors in Spanish companies that are less than three years old37 are entitled to a deduction of 
20% of their investment on the income tax (IRPF-Impuesta sobre la renta de las personas 
fisicas). The deduction is limited to €16,000 a year for a single tax payer. Moreover, investors 
must not have working relations with the company and they must not hold, together with the 
family group, more than 40% of its capital. 
Many autonomous communities offer additional incentives to their residents and 
companies. These regional tax reliefs are complementary to the state tax reliefs and increase 
the total deductible limit. For example, in Andalucía investors receive a supplementary 20% 
break. This means that if they invest in a new company, they can write off 40% of that 
investment on their income tax returns at the end of the year. Supplemental tax breaks by 
autonomous communities are described below: 
1) Madrid: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €4,000; 
2) Cataluña: deduction of 30% with a maximum amount of €6,000; 
3) Andalucía: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €4,000; 
4) Galicia: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €4,000; 
5) Aragón: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €4,000; 
6) Baleares: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €600; 
7) Murcia: deduction of 20% with a maximum amount of €4,000; 
8) Cantabria: deduction of 15% with a maximum amount of €2,000. 
The remaining regions do not have additional tax incentives. In order to be able to take 
advantage of these benefits, the company has to be fiscally resident in the same region of the 
investor. To encourage investing in early stage companies, Spain has also put into place others 
incentives. First, all profit made upon the disposal of the investment is not taxable under the 
following conditions: 
1) the reinvestment must be made in early-stage companies during the year following the 
disinvestment date; 
                                                          
36 Sociosinversores. ‘¿Tengo deducciones fiscales por inverter en el capital de Empresas ?’. Available at: 
https://www.sociosinversores.com/paginas/faq. 
 
37 Companies must also have an equity capital lower than €400,000 and must be constituted with the legal status 
of S.A. (Sciedad Anonima), S.L. (Sociedad Limitada), S.A.L. (Sociedad Anonima Laboral), and S.R.L.L 
(Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada Laboral). 
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2) the participation in the invested company shall be of at least three year's duration; 
3) the participation in the invested company together with the relatives of 1° and 2°s degree 
must not overcome the 40% of the social capital; 
4) there is no tax exemption for the participations sold to relatives of 2°degrees, or to entities 
linked to the sender. 
Second, if the invested company fails, the investment can be recovered by writing off your 
capital gains tax for up to four years. 
Donation in non-profit entities give investors (natural and legal persons) the possibility 
to obtain tax benefits38. In particular, for natural persons the first €150 donated has a deduction 
of 75% in the entire IRPF fee. What exceeds €150 has a deduction of 30% in the fee. A 
deduction of 35% (instead of the general 30%) may be applied, provided that donations have 
been made for the same or greater amount to the same entity in the two previous immediate tax 
periods. The deduction has a limit of 10% of the taxable base in the IRPF. For legal persons, 
the donated amount has a deduction in the corporate tax rate of 35%. A deduction of 40% 
(instead of the general 35%) may be applied provided that donations have been made for the 
same or greater amount to the same entity in the two previous immediate tax periods. The 
deduction has a limit of 10% of the tax base of the tax period. 
 
Belgium  
 
Belgian legislation provides interesting tax incentives for individuals whom invest in 
Belgian start-ups (SMEs or micro-enterprises) through crowdfunding platforms recognised by 
the Authority for Financial Services and Markets (FSMA)39. In particular, since the inception 
of the Crowdfunding Platform Act in 201740, all natural persons subject to the Belgian natural 
person tax or the non-resident person tax can benefit from: 
                                                          
38 Ramón Pérez Lucena - Abogado de Fundaciones. 2018. ‘Guíapráctica de deducciones fiscales en donaciones’. 
Available at: http://abogadodefundaciones.com/guia-practica-deducciones-fiscales-donaciones/.  
 
39 Bolero Crowdfunding. ‘Où en est le Tax Shelter annoncé? Puis-je déduire fiscalement mes Investissements 
effectués via Bolero Crowdfunding?’ Available at: https://bolero-crowdfunding.be/fr/faq?page=1. 
 
40 Before the entry into force of the crowdfunding law in 2017, crowdfunding platforms were not legally 
recognized in Belgium and tax benefits were available only for direct investment in start-ups. Now, tax benefits 
also apply for investment in start-ups through licensed crowdfunding platforms. 
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1) a personal income tax reduction of 30% of the sum invested in SMEs which have maximum 
50 employees, a turnover of maximum €40 million, and a total balance sheet value not 
exceeding €20 million; and  
2) a personal income tax reduction of 45% of the sum invested in micro-enterprises with 
maximum 10 employees, maximum revenue of €700,000, and a total balance sheet value 
not exceeding €350,000. 
The total amount of the investment qualifying for a tax exemption may not exceed 
€250,000 per start-up. 
Each person can invest a maximum of €100,000 per year and can benefit from a 
maximum of €45,000 in tax reduction each year. Tax relief can be gained for the year in which 
the investment occurred and cannot be refunded or transferred. Furthermore, in order to benefit 
from the tax benefit investors must hold onto the investment (shares) at least four years. 
No tax deductions are available to companies and any director of the start-up is not 
eligible for the tax advantage.  
In order to ensure the tax reliefs to their investors, the start-ups have to adhere to certain 
conditions, including: 
1) the start-up shall be an unlisted Belgian or EU tax resident company or must have a 
permanent establishment in Belgium or the EU; 
2) the funds raised cannot be used to distribute dividends, to issue loans or to buy shares during 
48 months as from the investment date; 
3) during at least 48 months as of the investment, the start-up cannot change their business to 
become an investment firm, a finance company, a treasury company, a management 
company, a real estate company, or a patrimonial company; 
4) the tax reduction may not exceed 30% of the start-up’s share capital per investor; 
5) the tax shelter investment must be fully paid up in cash; 
6) the start-up may not be the result of a merger or spin-off operation; 
7) the start-up may not have distributed any dividend or made any capital reduction previously. 
The new crowdfunding law also allows for a tax exemption on interest produced by 
loans to start-ups through regulated crowdfunding platforms. Unlike what is the case for equity 
investments, the tax exemption on interest is available for both private individuals and start-ups 
as long as they meet the criteria defined above. The maximum exempted amount on interest, 
per taxpayer per year, may not exceed €15,000 of the loan (article 21,13° of the Belgian Income 
Tax Code). The maturity of the exempted tranche of the loan must be of at least four years. 
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Belgian investors can obtain a tax advantage by supporting a charity (i.e. institutions 
listed in the law or registered institutions) and large relief operations through donation based 
crowdfunding platforms. In particular, Belgians can recover between 40% and 50% annually 
of their donation, which may not exceed 10% of their total net income. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis severely affected terms and conditions of European 
SMEs and start-ups’ funding (Brown and Earle, 2017; Cosh et al., 2009), by forcing them to 
use lending channels different from the traditional banking channels, such as venture capital, 
business angels, and more recently, crowdfunding. However, the limited availability in Europe 
of these new sources of finance has forced policy makers to offer tax incentives in order to 
remove barriers and encourage investment through venture capital funds, business angels, and 
crowdfunding (Wilson, 2015). A number of tax incentive schemes to promote crowdfunding 
has already been implemented in Europe, moreover many additional European countries and 
regions are considering their implementation. Some countries (i.e. the UK) have adopted 
existing schemes by adapting them to the new form of investments while others countries have 
put in place new tailored schemes (i.e. Italy). In addition, some countries provide tax incentives 
both at the national and regional levels (i.e. Spain). In light of the potential role to be played by 
crowdfunding in the early-stage market, this chapter provides a comprehensive description of 
European tax incentive schemes in force in order to understand the drivers behind crowdfunding 
development. It deeply analyses the tax incentives, including their peculiarities and limitations, 
for crowdfunding in force in the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium. Its findings are relevant 
for European policy makers because the development of crowdfunding activity is crucial to 
tackle the long-standing deficiencies in the entrepreneurial financial environment and improve 
our financial markets by means of innovation-led growth. Since terms and conditions of 
European SMEs and start-ups’ funding are among the most significant challenges for the 
creation, survival and growth of these firms, tax incentives to investors can be considered as a 
tool to reduce their dependence on banks and to increase the availability of credit for those 
companies, even if tax incentives are difficult to build up and to implement. In order to make 
them more accessible to start-ups and other resource-constrained firms, we need a proper design 
of targeted incentives and an evaluation of the different market forces and imperfections. 
Moreover, governments have to calibrate their fiscal policies based on the specific 
characteristics of investors and firms, that might take advantages of such incentives. Mainly 
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due to the lack of data, there is no conclusive evidence on whether and how tax incentives 
should be used to promote crowdfunding investments. This work aims to represent a first step 
in this direction: it provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of tax incentives schemes 
in force in Europe for investors and companies planning to use crowdfunding as a fundraising 
tool. 
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Chapter 4 
Does the fight against corruption increase the investors’ confidence in equity 
crowdfunding? Evidence from Latin America41 
 
Corruption normally causes diffidence among investors and can be potentially able to 
negatively affect investments. Specifically, the decline in investments is one of the most 
significant problems in Latin American countries. In such contexts, anti-corruption laws can 
have a beneficial double effect to fight corruption and promote business, by restoring investors’ 
trust in doing investments. This chapter investigates whether the introduction of an anti-
corruption framework affecting both public and private spheres is able to increase investors’ 
confidence in a new form of investment, that is equity crowdfunding. By using a unique 
database, with combined information from different platforms in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, the 
following study is based on the population of 492 projects over the period 2013-2017.  
Implementing a set of linear probability regressions, it finds that the new Mexican anti-
corruption law has increased the probability of success of equity crowdfunding projects in this 
country compared to Brazilian and Chilean projects, suggesting the existence of a causal 
relation between anti-corruption rules and investments in a highly perceived corrupt 
environment, further characterized by a low level of investors’ protection. A placebo test which 
confirms the main results was performed as a robustness check. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Co-authored by: 
 F. Battaglia, Università degli Studi di Napoli Parthenope (Italy); 
 M. Carboni, Università degli Studi Roma Tre (Italy); 
 S. Monferrà, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Italy). 
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Introduction 
 
The Latin America countries are normally perceived as highly corrupt (Gaviria, 2002; 
Canache and Allison, 2005; Seligson, 2006; Hauk, 2017). The political scandals affecting these 
countries over the last few years (Zabludovsky, 2013; Casas-Zamora and Carter, 2017) have 
sparked public outrage against corruption, so that investors do not consider them as credible 
countries. Since 2014, Brazil has been rocked by the largest corruption scandal in its history, 
the ramifications of which are still ongoing. Interestingly, the measures against corruption 
proposed by the federal prosecutors over the course of the investigation (known as “Operation 
Carwash”) were then rejected. Compared to Brazil, Chile annually shows a higher score of the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), meaning that this country is perceived as having a lower 
level of public sector corruption42. However, recently this country faced some corruption 
scandals, as those involving the Penta Group and the Chile’s Chemistry and Mining Society 
“Soquimich”, both accused to corrupt politicians from the current administration, the previous 
one and the opposition by financing political campaigns (Craze and Quiroga, 2014; The 
Economist, 2014; Bonnefoy, 2015a and 2015b; Ramírez, 2015; Casas-Zamora, 2016), that 
contributed to worsen its position in the general ranking reporting the CPI. With respect to 
Brazil and Chile, Mexico has the highest level of perceived corruption, with a CPI score of 
35/100 in 2014, which worsened in the following years (see for example the corruption scandals 
exposed by the Mexican press which have involved the brother of the former Mexican 
President, Raúl Salinas de Gortari, accused of “unlawful enrichment”, and the Secretary of 
Public Security - SSP García Luna, accused of abuse of power and close ties to drug trafficking 
groups43).  
Following a growing stream of literature focusing on the relationship between 
corruption and investment (entrepreneurship), it is possible to argue that corruption reduces 
economic growth, creates mistrust in institutions and lowers both public and private 
investments (Mauro 1995 and 1996; Bardhan 1997; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Treisman 
2000 and 2007; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Boudreaux et al., 
2018). Specifically, high levels of perceived corruption negatively influence investment 
decisions by increasing risk and uncertainty faced by investors (Barassi and Zhou, 2012; 
Delgato et al., 2014; Godinez and Liu, 2015). Importantly, the reduction of national and foreign 
                                                          
42 The CPI is a composite index based on subjective perceptions produced by the Transparency International (a 
non-governmental organization involved in the fight against corruption worldwide). The index currently ranks 180 
countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
43 See Estevez, 2013. 
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investments is one of the most significant problems in Latin America (Zhang, 2001; Bengoa 
and Sanchez-Robles, 2003). Therefore, anti-corruption rules can represent the solution not only 
to fight corruption effectively but also to promote investments, by restoring investors’ trust. 
This is the case of Mexico, a highly perceived corrupt country, further characterized by a low 
level of investors’ protection rules (Schwab, 2014), that in 2015 completely reformed the anti-
corruption framework in the country. Specifically: “on May 27, 2015, a Constitutional 
amendment was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation, to reform 14 Articles of the 
Political Constitution of the United Mexican States44, and create a new framework against 
corruption”.45 Only one month after, in June 2015, the Mexican states voted to amend the 
Constitution in order to strengthen the anti-corruption legal framework particularly with 
reference to the private companies that often exploit tax laws, abuse legal loopholes, hide 
corrupt acts behind secret subsidiaries and partnerships or pay bribes to influence political 
decision-making illicitly. The main aim was to prevent corruption by helping companies to 
develop anti-corruption codes and business principles for countering bribery, and at the same 
time to assure more severely jail sentences in order to create a more honest and clean operating 
environment, increasing investors trust. Moreover, through the vote the institutions responsible 
of the prevention, control, investigation and punishment of corruption in Mexico were given 
new power, and a National Anti-Corruption System was consolidated. Mexico has taken 
another important step in the fight against corruption on July 18, 2016, when the Constitutional 
amendment was implemented by means of a series of laws, including (i) the General Law for 
the National Anti-Corruption System; (ii) the Organic Law for the Federal Tribunal on 
Administrative Justice; and (iii) the General Law of Administrative Responsibilities (GLAR - 
Ley General de Responsabilidades Administrativas). The latter also applies to private persons 
(companies and individuals) who commit acts considered to be “linked to serious 
administrative offenses” (Article 4, subparagraph III; Articles 65-70).  
In a highly perceived corrupt country, besides characterized by a low level of investors’ 
protection rules, the passage of anti-corruption regulation can be able to restore the investors’ 
trust and therefore to foster the level of investments. Specifically, the effect should be greater 
for investments implying a “bet”, as equity crowdfunding, i.e., a new way of funding early-
                                                          
44Articles 22, 28, 41, 73, 74, 76, 79, 104, 108, 109, 113, 114, 116 and 122. 
45De la Peña, A. and Villasenor, F., 2017, “Upcoming Mexico Anti-Corruption Law: What Does it Mean for 
Companies Doing Business in Mexico?”, Haynes and Boone, LLP, available at: 
http://www.haynesboone.com/publications/new-mexico-anti-corruption-law. For details see “Decreto por el que 
se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, en materia de combate a la corrupción”, Diario Oficial de la Federación dated 27 May, 2015. Available 
at:  http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/docleg/62/223_DOF_27may15.pdf . 
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stage unlisted companies by raising many small amounts of capital from a large number of 
small investors – via online platforms – who receive in return equity shares of these companies. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that the new framework against corruption, dated May 2015, 
is able to positively impact investors’ confidence, and so the level of investments in Mexico. 
Among the existing forms of investments, this work focuses on equity crowdfunding by 
assuming that investors’ confidence is crucial in the choice of investing in new projects. In 
other words, the following study investigates whether the introduction of new rules, aimed to 
fight corruption and indirectly also to protect investments having great potential in terms of 
returns, increase investors’ confidence in investing in equity crowdfunding. 
Although various studies focused on the determinants of equity crowdfunding success 
(Agrawal et al., 2015; Ahlers et al., 2015; Belleflamme et al., 2013, 2014; Mollick, 2014; 
Vismara, 2016 and 2017; Vulkan et al., 2016; Angerer et al., 2017; Block et al., 2018; Günther 
et al., 2018), this is the first study investigating the link between the success of equity 
crowdfunding projects and anti-corruption regulation in Latin America. Specifically, the study 
uses a hand-collected database and the creation of a new framework against corruption affecting 
also the private sector in Mexico as an exogenous shock to investigate whether the fight against 
corruption increases investors’ confidence to invest in new projects, specifically in the 
emerging segment of equity crowdfunding. The findings show that, following the creation of 
the anti-corruption framework, equity crowdfunding projects are effectively more likely to 
succeed. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies 
and develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 describes data and sample, while section 4 
describes the identification strategy. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the main results and robustness 
checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
Literature, contribution and research hypothesis  
 
The existing literature on crowdfunding focuses mainly on three streams of studies46: 
(i) crowdfunding regulation (Hazen, 2011; Fink, 2012; Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Stemler, 2013; 
Wroldsen, 2013; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017); (ii) companies 
and investors’ motivations of crowdfunding (Ordanini et al., 2011; Hemer et al., 2011; 
                                                          
46For detailed literature review see Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017); Bouncken et al. (2015); Moritz and Block 
(2016); Short et al., (2017). 
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Belleflamme et al., 2010, 2013, 2014; Gerber et al., 2012; Hienerth and Riar, 2013; Burtch et 
al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014; Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014; Hu et al., 2015; Macht and 
Weatherston, 2014; Allison et al., 2015; Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Hornuf and 
Schwienbacher, 2018); and (iii) crowdfunding success factors ( Ordanini et al., 2011; 
Belleflamme et al., 2013;Mollick, 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2015; Cordova et 
al., 2015; Koch and Siering, 2015; Cumming et al., 2016; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Kunz 
et al., 2016; Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016; Signori and Vismara, 2016; Vulkan et al., 2016; 
Angerer et al., 2017; Vismara, 2016, 2017; Vismara et al. 2017; Block et al., 2018; Günther et 
al., 2018; Polzin et al., 2018). Referring to the first stream of studies, dealing with crowdfunding 
regulation, a growing body of research focuses on the legal provisions required to implement 
crowdfunding and increase access to capital for start-ups and SMEs. Some authors highlight 
the lack of a specific regulation, which can harm crowdfunding initiatives, and the need to 
develop a harmonised regulatory framework across Europe (Klöhn and Hornuf, 2012; Hornuf 
and Schwienbacher, 2017). Other studies analyse the legal implication and risks, such as the 
weaker investor protection and potential for fraud, caused by the rapid growth of crowdfunding 
(Hazen, 2011; Fink, 2012; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Stemler, 2013; Wroldsen, 2013). They 
conclude that, in order to mitigate the previous risks, crowdfunding must be approached with 
caution through specific regulation, and this is the only workable way of helping investors make 
informed decisions and limiting the amounts they can put at risk.  
The second stream of literature focuses on the motivations of crowdfunding, both from 
the investors and firms’ point of view. Some empirical studies, by analysing the determinants 
of individual investment decisions (Ordanini et al., 2011;Hemer et al., 2011; Gerber et al., 2012; 
Lin et al., 2014; Allison et al., 2015;Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 
2018), find that investors are not just interested in the financial return but are motivated also by 
the social reputation, self-affirmation, fun, and the possibility of support companies or projects 
in which they believe and can identify themselves (notably in the donation and reward model). 
Other contributions investigate both the financial and non-financial reasons of companies for 
choosing crowdfunding (Belleflamme et al., 2010, 2013, 2014; Hemer et al., 2011; Gerber et 
al., 2012; Burtch et al., 2014; Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014; Hu et al., 2015; Hienerth and 
Riar, 2013; Macht and Weatherston, 2014). Generally, these studies suggest that the main 
reason why companies adopt crowdfunding is the need for liquidity (notably in the early stage). 
Other potential motivations are related to obtain a better access to customers and outside funders 
(i.e. business angels and venture capital), as well as strong relationships and networks, and a 
feedback for their products or services. Finally, companies can adopt crowdfunding also to 
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increase visibility and public attention and exploit the speed and flexibility of the online funding 
process. 
Finally, the third and the most extensive stream of literature analyses the determinants 
of campaigns success. Specifically, the most relevant studies on the topic focus on the properties 
of the offer and its funding dynamics, such as the fundraising goal, the duration, the percentage 
of offered equity, the number of early investors, the presence of voting rights or tax incentives 
schemes, the composition of the top management team (Belleflamme et al., 2013; Mollick, 
2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; Ralcheva and Roosenboom, 2016; Signori and Vismara, 2016; 
Vismara, 2016; Vismara et al. 2017; Vulkan et al., 2016). Other authors analyse the information 
flow, by finding that crowdfunding campaigns’ success is positively related to a great deal of 
information on the campaign, its objectives, and risks, and on the capital distribution of the 
business plan (Colombo et al., 2015; Kunz et al., 2016; Vismara, 2018; Block et al., 2018). In 
addition, some empirical studies measure the importance of the presence of a product video, 
the images quality, and the number of comments and updates in increasing the campaigns 
success probability (Cordova et al., 2015; Koch and Siering, 2015; Kunz et al., 2016; Vismara 
et al. 2017; Angerer et al., 2017; Block et al., 2018). Kunz et al. (2016), using data from reward-
based campaigns, argue that giving information about promoters’ crowdfunding activity, such 
as financing their own campaign and/or others campaigns, provides them with a useful 
experience and send a positive signal to investors. Additional studies calculate the effect of the 
geographical distribution of firms and investors in the funding success of campaigns (Hornuf 
and Schmitt, 2016; Lin and Viswanathan, 2016). They find home bias effects for investors in 
crowdfunding contexts, which are responsive to the distance and prefer to invest in 
geographically closest firms. The recent literature on success factors for crowdfunding focuses 
mainly on the role of investors’ and proponents’ social networks (Ordanini et al., 2011; Mollick, 
2014; Colombo et al., 2015; Kromidha and Robson, 2016; Vismara, 2016; Angerer et al., 2017; 
Polzin et al., 2018). Some of these authors find that a larger number of social network 
connections increases the probability of fundraising success in both reward-based and equity 
crowdfunding, by reducing the information asymmetry. Indeed, by linking their social network 
profiles to the platform accounts the projects’ proponents provide additional information to 
potential investors. Some authors (e.g., Vismara, 2016) based their study on professional 
connections (e.g., the LinkedIn connections), while others (e.g., Mollick, 2014) use friendship 
connections (e.g., the Facebook and Twitter ones). In these cases, the positive impact on 
campaigns success is widely recognised. Although the paper of Cumming et al. (2016) fits into 
this strand of literature analysing the key factors of crowdfunding success, it differs from 
72 
 
previous studies on the topic as it is the first one to investigate the frequency of fraud in 
crowdfunding markets and its empirical determinants. 
This study is related to the growing literature on crowdfunding focusing on the 
determinants of campaigns success. To this end, an empirical contribution documenting the 
existence of a causal relationship between the fight against the corruption and the investments 
in new projects has been carried out. At my best knowledge, there are no studies investigating 
the link between corruption and crowdfunding. Moreover, there are no papers showing a causal 
relation between the creation of a new legal framework regulating anti-corruption and the 
success of equity crowdfunding campaigns.  
The point of view expressed in this study is that corruption normally causes diffidence 
among investors and can be potentially able to negatively affect investments. Specifically, the 
decline of investments is one of the most significant problems in Latin American countries. In 
such contexts, anti-corruption laws can have the beneficial double effect to fight corruption and 
promote business, by restoring investors’ trust in doing investments. From a theoretical 
perspective, by following the legitimacy approach, it is possible to argue that trust is easier to 
build in countries characterized by a low level of corruption (Bruton et al., 2010; Lin et al., 
2013). 
Research on corruption is complicated by the fact that the factors causing corruption are 
also the factors that comes with it, and this creates a vicious circle (Kaufmann, 1997). 
Nevertheless, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature which analyses the causes and 
the effects of corruption in both developed and developing countries (Tanzi, 1998; Lambsdorff, 
2006; Amore and Bennedsen, 2013)47. In these studies, data on corruption are often based on 
the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI).  
An important body of literature on corruption emphasizes the role of regulatory quality 
on corruption and, as consequence, on investment (La Porta et al., 1999; Bénassy‐Quéré, 2007; 
Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Vague and lax government rules trigger much corruption and create 
mistrust among investors; instead a “good” regulation, defined by clear rules and applied 
through transparent mechanisms, can help contain corruption and put investors in a position to 
trust (Gerring and Thacker, 2005). However, bad regulation and corruption are quite often two 
                                                          
47Among the main causes of corruption, the existing studies identify the culture and the social norms existing 
within a society (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; Barr and Serra, 2010; Ivanyna et al., 2016), 
the form of democracy (Huntington, 1970; Andvig, 2006; Corchon, 2008; Iwasaki and Suzuki, 2012; Jetter et al., 
2015), the government structure (Gerring and Thacker, 2004 and 2005), the lack of economic competition (Jong-
sung and Khagram, 2005), and some geographic and historical variables, such as the abundance of natural 
resources and the geographical proximity to corrupt states (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Asiedu, 2006). 
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side of the same coin. In many cases, corruption causes bad regulation. Under this view, reforms 
should avoid complicated rules, difficult to administer, and should design individual incentives 
to promote honest decision making. The absence of law credibility raises the risk of corruption 
and has a strong impact on both domestic and incoming foreign direct investments, which tend 
to deteriorate, with some types of investment which suffer more than others. For example, Wei 
and Wu (2001) find that while corruption reduced foreign direct investments (FDI), there is no 
impact of corruption on bank loans. The correlation between the size of FDI and the host 
country’s risk factor, which includes corruption, is widely recognized (Wei, 2000; Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2001 and 2002; Egger and Winner, 2006; Javorcik and Wei, 2009; Asiedu and 
Freeman, 2009; Barassi and Zhou, 2012; Delgato et al., 2014; Godinez and Liu, 2015).  
Many papers on the topic explore more specifically the rates of entrepreneurship as they 
relate to corruption (e.g., Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Avnimelech et al., 2014; Dutta and Sobel, 
2016; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; Rose, 2000; Radaev, 2004; Ovaska 
and Sobel, 2005; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Busenitz et al., 2000; Glaeser and Sacks, 
2006; Estrin et al., 2013; Aidis et al., 2012) and find mixed results regarding the impact of 
corruption on enterpreneurship and economic growth. Some papers (e.g., Dreher and 
Gassebner, 2013; Rose, 2000; Radaev, 2004; Ovaska and Sobel, 2005) suggest that corruption 
can improve enterpreneurial opportunities, conditional on a country having a preexisting bad 
business climate. For example, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) find that corruption is beneficial 
in highly regulated economies with a higher number of procedures required to start a business 
and a larger minimum capital requirement. The contrasting strand of literature (e.g., Anokhin 
and Schulze, 2009; Avnimelech et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000; Busenitz et 
al., 2000; Glaeser and Sacks, 2006; Estrin et al., 2013) argues that corruption in government is 
harmful for overall growth and prosperity in general. More specifically, Anokhin and Schulze 
(2009) show that corruption is bad for entrepreneurship and innovation and that efforts to 
control corruption increase levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to 
reliably and impartially enforce law and the rules of trade. Estrin et al. (2013) find that less 
corrupted environments and stronger protection of property rights increase the growth plans of 
entrepreneurs. Aidis et al. (2012) find mixed results, however when they remove the richest 
countries from their models, the effect of corruption appears strongest in lowering 
entrepreneurship. 
Despite many theoretical and empirical studies analyse the impact of corruption on 
investments and entrepreneurship, this literature review clearly shows the lack of papers 
investigating the relationship between corruption and equity crowdfunding investment. This 
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completely new environment requires investigation in order to assess whether a new legal 
framework regulating anti-corruption in highly perceived corrupt contexts, with a low level of 
investors’ protection, could promote the success of equity crowdfunding campaigns, by 
restoring investors’ trust in doing investments. 
To this end, the following analysis aims to extend the existing literature on factors 
affecting the success of crowdfunding campaigns, by providing a first and unique empirical 
evidence on the effect of the fight against corruption on investment oriented towards 
crowdfunding in Latin America. 
 
Data and sample 
 
This study is based on a hand-collected dataset of 492 projects, out of which 338 were 
unsuccessful in reaching their fundraising goal, listed on all existing equity crowdfunding 
platforms in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico at the date of data collection (November 2017). 
Specifically, the following platforms are analysed: 
 Broota.com.br, Eqseed, Start Me Up, and Eusocio from Brazil; 
 Broota.cl from Chile, and  
 Crowdfunder.mx and Play Business from Mexico48.  
 
The list of platforms is reported in Table 4, which reports the city in which the platform 
is located, the foundation year, and the current state (active/inactive). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 The list of Mexican equity-based platforms is from the AFICO (Asociacion de plataformas de fondeo colectivo) 
website and it refers to the members list. The list of Chilean platforms is from the FinteChile (Asociación Fintech 
de Chile) website. The Brazilian platforms list has been built up basing on the record provided by the report “2017 
The Americas Alternative Finance Industry Report” (see Ziegler et al., 2017) carried out by the Cambridge centre 
of alternative finance, the Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation, and the University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business. Since the list provided by this report includes all the typologies of crowdfunding, platforms 
have been double-checked on the web and only the equity-based ones have been selected. 
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Table 4. Crowdfunding platforms 
Platform City Foundation year Model Status 
 Brazil    
     
Broota.br (currently Kria) São Paulo 2014 Equity Active 
Eqseed Rio de Janeiro 2014 Equity Active 
Eusocio Rio de Janeiro 2013 Equity Active 
Startmeup São Paulo 2015 Equity Active 
 Chile    
     
Broota.com Santiago 2013 Equity Active 
 Mexico    
     
Crowdfunder.mx Mexico City 2015 Equity Currently inactive 
PlayBusiness Mexico City 2014 Equity  Active 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
A time period spanning 4 years, i.e., from the inception of the platforms (2013 for Chile 
and Brazil, and 2014 for Mexico) to the end of 2017 was considered. The number of projects 
by platform and year is reported in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Projects by platform and year 
Campaign 
year 
Broota Broota.br Crowdfunder Eqseed Eusocio Playbusiness Startmeup Total 
2013 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
2014 5 6 0 0 3 45 0 59 
2015 13 17 0 1 3 119 2 155 
2016 13 19 3 2 0 89 6 132 
2017 18 17 15 9 0 73 3 135 
Total 60 59 18 12 6 326 11 492 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
The analysis covers only Brazil, Chile, and Mexico since the remaining countries in 
Latin America do not have a single equity crowdfunding platform (Ziegler et al., 2017). 
Moreover, only the native equity crowdfunding platforms, excluding foreign ones, are taken 
into account. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only sample of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns in Latin America collected so far. 
The analysed platforms work according to the traditional “All-or-Nothing” model 
(Cumming et al., 2015), thus a project is considered as successful or funded only if the 100% 
of the funding goal or more is reached within the specified time period, which is generally of 
60-180 days. However, to encourage the use of equity crowdfunding, the "Instrução nº 588" of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil - Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) 
– states that on the Brazilian platforms it is enough to raise at least two-thirds of the fundraising 
goal to obtain a success. Once the campaign is ended, invested amounts are transferred from 
the escrow accounts to the founders’ accounts. After that, investors become shareholders in the 
company and they acquire all the established rights. Conversely, when the funding goal is not 
reached, the platforms will refund the invested amount to investors. All the successful 
campaigns are displayed on platforms websites following a similar structure, ensuring 
homogeneity and comparability for the collected information. The collected information 
includes the properties of the offer (i.e., on the fundraising goal and the minimum investment 
allowed for each campaign), and the founders' features, including their total number and their 
crowdfunding activity on the platform, as reported on the “team” page of each campaign. 
Information about the number of LinkedIn connections which are available on the personal 
LinkedIn profile of each founder are also collected. 
All the unsuccessful campaigns are deleted at the end of fundraising round, thus 
information on them are obtained from the platforms’ CEOs and CTOs. Since data on 
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companies’ location are not always available on the platforms websites, these information are 
drawn from Orbis database. Then, the four classes of functional urban areas, identified by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), are used to distinguish 
between large metropolitan areas (i.e., areas with population above 1.5 million), metropolitan 
areas (i.e., areas with population between 500.000 and 1.5 million), and medium-sized and 
small urban areas (i.e., areas with population, respectively, between 200.000 and 500.000 and 
50.000 and 200.000). 
 
Identification strategy 
 
This chapter investigates whether the new framework against corruption -  affecting the 
private sector -increases investors’ confidence in new investments, and therefore the success of 
equity crowdfunding campaigns by using a difference-in-difference model applied to a repeated 
cross-sections data structure. To employ such a model, the outcome in the treatment and control 
group would follow the same trend without any treatment. Since the common trend assumption 
is hard to verify, in the results section is shown that the trend of the two groups was the same 
before the treatment. 
In the analysis is employed a set of linear probability regressions, where the dependent 
variable (project_status) is a binary variable taking value 1 for successful equity crowdfunding 
campaigns (i.e. campaigns reaching the fundraising goal in the time period imposed by the 
platform), and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β for the binary variable w, which takes 
value1 for Mexican campaigns after investors became aware of the anti-corruption law 
enactment (i.e., after 2015) and 0 otherwise. The variable treated is a binary variable taking 
value 1 for Mexican campaigns, and 0 for Brazilian and Chilean campaigns; while the variable 
post is a binary variable equal to 1 one year after that the new framework against corruption 
was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on 2015 (i.e. from 2016 onward), and 0 
otherwise, i.e. for the years 2014-2015. Specifically, the year 2013 is dropped since only Chile 
showed information for this year. 
This study investigates the impact of the new anti-corruption rules one year after the 
introduction of the new anti-corruption framework since in Mexico the government 
bureaucracy is highly inefficient (Peeters et al., 2018). Therefore, it is possible to believe that 
the effect of the new regulation could be observed starting from 2016. 
According to previous studies, the fundraising goal variable (f_goal) is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the amount that founders seek to raise using crowdfunding, in millions 
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USD (Mollick, 2014). The analysis includes the average investment (av_inv), which is 
calculated by dividing the final funding by the number of investors, and the minimum 
investment allowed for each campaign, in millions USD (inv_min). Since the web page of each 
project on the platform reports additional information about the founders’ team, data on the 
number of founders’ members are collected (n_fund - see Vismara et al., 2017). Founders have 
the possibility to self-financing their own project and any other project published on the 
platform. These information (including the invested sums) are made publicly available through 
the “Team” page of each project, which implies that each potential investor can easily become 
aware of the crowdfunding activity carried out by each founder. By following Kunz et al. (2016) 
it is possible to argue that, funding their own project and/or that of others, founders send a 
positive signal to the potential investors, by showing them that they used crowdfunding, not 
only to get money but because they believed in the crowdfunding idea. Therefore, the analysis 
includes two variables referring to the other campaigns financially supported by the company’s 
team (t_oth), and the team self-financing (f_self). 
Following Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016), also the company location (large) is 
considered. Specifically, in this analysis the functional urban areas - identified by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) – are used49. The 
expectation is that companies located in large metropolitan areas, due to the highest 
concentration of potential investors, are more effective in attracting investors than those located 
either just in metropolitan areas or in small and medium urban areas. To attract potential 
investors, founders may open a Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn profile of the project in addition 
to their personal one, and they may link these social network profiles to the platform accounts, 
to interact with potential investors, by providing them additional information about the 
company and the team activity, and by sponsoring the campaign. Following Colombo et al. 
(2015), the number of connections of each founder on his LinkedIn profile (lkd) is recorded, 
and then the average number of the LinkedIn connections of all founders are calculated. Given 
that the LinkedIn connections are not immediately available on the platforms, this information 
is obtained by searching on LinkedIn the name, the geographic location, and profession of 
founders, when available. However, due to limitations in data collection, this information is 
collected at the end of the campaign, rather than at its beginning. Since it is not possible to 
exclude that the campaign success may increase the LinkedIn connections, following Mollick 
                                                          
49 The OECD identifies four classes of functional urban areas: Small urban area, with population between 50.000 
and 200.000; Medium-sized urban areas, with population between 200.000 and 500.000; Metropolitan areas, with 
population between 500.000 and 1.5 million; and Large metropolitan areas, with population above 1.5 million. 
79 
 
(2014), Colombo et al. (2015), and Vismara (2016), the analysis considers the founders’ 
personal connections, which are less likely to increase significantly after the project success, 
rather than project connections. Among the different social networks, it is preferable to use 
LinkedIn, which is based on professional contacts, instead of social networks that are based on 
friendship (such as Facebook). Data sources and variables are presented in Table 6, Table 7 
reports the summary statistics, and Table 8 reports the correlation matrix. 
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Table 6. Variables and data sources 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
 
Variable Symbol Description 
Data 
sources 
Dependent variables    
Project status project_status 
Binary variable equals to 1 if crowdfunding project 
succeeds, and 0 otherwise. 
Platforms* 
Explanatory variables    
Treated treated 
Binary variable equals to 1 for Mexican campaigns, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Platforms 
Post post 
Binary variable equals to1 for campaigns made from 
2016 onwards, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Treatment effect w 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
Mexican campaigns made from 2016 onwards, and 0 
otherwise. 
Platforms 
Fundraising goal 
 
f_goal 
 
The amount that founders seek to raise using 
crowdfunding in millions USD. 
Platforms 
Average investment 
av_inv 
 
The total amount raised at the end of the campaign 
divided by the number of investors, in millions USD. 
Platforms 
Number of founders  
n_fund 
 
The total number of company’s founders as reported 
on the “team” page of each campaign. 
Platforms 
Minimum investment 
inv_min 
 
The minimum investment allowed for each campaign, 
in millions USD. 
 
Platforms 
Team support others 
campaigns 
 
t_oth 
 
Binary variable equals to 1 whether the team members 
of the company made an investment to others 
campaigns, and 0 otherwise. 
Platforms 
Urban area type 
 
large 
 
Binary variable equals to 1 whether the company is 
located in a large metropolitan area, and 0 otherwise. 
Orbis 
Founders self-financing 
 
f_self 
 
Binary variable equals to 1 whether the founders have 
self-financing their own project, and 0 otherwise. 
Platforms 
LinkedIn founders’ 
connections  
lkd 
 
The average number of founders’ LinkedIn 
connections. 
LinkedIn 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study, by taking into account 
the same number of observations of the first model’s running (see Table 9). All values are expressed in 
real USD to 31 December of the year related to the campaign. Treated campaigns (Mexican campaigns) 
are 284, while untreated campaigns (Brazilian and Chilean campaigns) are 122. 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
treated 406 0.6995 0.4590 0 1 
f_goal 406 69478.69 82305.38 2896.2 737664 
av_inv 406 1451.818 2772.836 0 25450 
n_fund 406 1.9901 0.9053 1 6 
inv_min 406 286.7157 982.8904 4.827 16500 
t_oth 406 0.06650 0.2494 0 1 
large 406 0.6773 0.4680 0 1 
f_self 406 0.0985 0.2983 0 1 
lkd 406 299.6124 182.7182 0 501 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from STATA 
 
 
Table 8. Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in this papers. 
           
 
treated post f_goal av_inv n_fund inv_min t_oth large f_self lkd 
 
          
treated 1          
post -0.0622 1         
f_goal -0.4836 0.1233 1        
av_inv -0.3610 0.0949 0.4791 1       
n_fund -0.1453 0.1450 0.0039 0.0704 1      
inv_min -0.3172 0.0422 0.3241 0.3228 0.0741 1     
t_oth -0.4074 0.0313 0.2562 0.2319 0.1237 0.1969 1    
large -0.0375 0.0304 0.0646 0.1277 -0.0326 0.0749 0.0146 1   
f_self -0.4866 0.0444 0.2881 0.2998 0.1870 0.2241 0.5089 -0.0199 1  
lkd -0.4114 0.0716 0.3553 0.2627 0.0700 0.2159 0.2387 0.2025 0.2548 1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from STATA 
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Results 
 
This study investigates whether, after the introduction of a new framework against 
corruption affecting the private sector in Mexico, the equity crowdfunding campaigns become 
more likely to succeed. First, the analysis shows that the common trend assumption holds. The 
Figure 2 provides the mean of the dependent variable (project_status) for the period before the 
treatment (i.e., for the years 2014-2015) and also after the treatment (i.e., for the years 2016-
2017), reporting a parallel trend for the pre-treatment period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Successful projects (time period 2014-2017) 
This figure shows the mean of the dependent variable Project status on the vertical axis from 2014 to 
2017. The years are plotted along the horizontal axis. The Mexican campaigns represent the treated 
group, while Brazilian and Chilean campaigns represent the untreated group. The trend of treated and 
untreated campaigns is parallel in the pre-treatment period (2014-2015). 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
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Table 9 reports the results for the linear probability regressions. The coefficient of 
interest is always estimated for the treatment variable w, which equals 1 for treated campaigns 
after the introduction of the new framework against corruption (i.e., 2016 onward) and 0 
otherwise (i.e., for untreated campaigns at any time and treated campaigns up to 2015). This 
coefficient provides information about the causal effect of the establishment of a new anti-
corruption framework. Specifically, the coefficient estimate for the treatment variable (w) is 
statistically significant (at 5%) in all model specifications. As expected, the treatment effect is 
not affected by adding campaigns’ characteristics to the regression model. In columns 4, 3, 2, 
and 1 are added campaigns characteristics (fundraising goal, average investment, number of 
founders, minimum investment, team support other campaigns, urban area type, founders self-
financing, LinkedIn founders’ connections) as control variables, and the effect remains 
statistically significant, indicating that treated campaigns increased their success probability 
more than untreated campaigns did, following the new framework against corruption. 
Specifically, the first column (Table 9) shows that the introduction of the anti-corruption 
framework in Mexico increased the probability of project success by 13.17%. 
A potential explanation for these results is that treated campaigns enjoyed of a greater 
trust from investors who felt more protected following the creation of a more robust legal 
framework. 
Regarding the control variables, the results are generally consistent with those obtained 
from previous studies. Specifically, the regression analysis finds statistically significant 
empirical evidence that the others projects financially supported by the company team are 
associated with the final success of the crowdfunding campaign, as well as the founders’ self-
financing. These evidences reflect the investors’ positive perception of team crowdfunding 
activity (Kunz et al., 2016).  
In line with Ahlers et al. (2015) and Vismara (2016), the analysis finds that the number 
of founders is positive and statistically significant related to campaign success. This evidence 
is consistent with the possible conviction of investors that a higher number of founders, with 
different backgrounds and different type of knowledge coming together, can ensure the success 
of the invested companies.  
The results also show that the founders’ LinkedIn connections significantly affect the 
campaign success probability. Previous studies investigating the relevance of social networks 
in the equity crowdfunding context show that founders’ LinkedIn connections are predictors of 
campaigns’ success. Vismara (2016), for example, finds that campaigns in which founders have 
a large number of LinkedIn connections increase their success probability. 
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According to Mollick (2014) and Colombo et al. (2015), the analysis finds that the 
probability of success is negatively related to the fundraising goal. 
As expected, campaigns from companies located in large metropolitan areas are more 
likely to success than those located in smaller urban areas due to the highest concentration of 
potential investors. 
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Table 9. The impact of the new anti-corruption framework on equity crowdfunding 
This table reports the results for a set of linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable 
This table reports the results for a set of linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable 
is project_status (a binary variable that identifies the success of equity crowdfunding projects). The 
treatment variable (w) is equal to 1 for Mexican campaigns, which were affected by the new framework 
against corruption, following the new regulation (i.e., for years 2016-2017), and 0 otherwise. Starting 
from the last columns (column 5), in each regression are included control variables referring to the social 
network information (stlkd), the financial information (f_self), the geographical information (large), the 
information about investment to others campaigns by the team members (t_oth), the minimum allowed 
investment (stinv_min), the total number of company’s founders (stn_fund), the average investment 
(stav_inv), and finally information related to the amount that founders seek to raise using crowdfunding 
(stln_f_goal). The variables stln_f_goal, stav_inv, stn_fund, stinv_min, stlkd are standardized. All the 
specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at industry level 
(three-digit sic codes, except in 4 cases providing only two-digit sic codes). The asterisks *, ** or *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 project_status project_status project_status project_status project_status 
VARIABLES      
      
treated -0.4545*** -0.5108*** -0.5409*** -0.5355*** -0.5626*** 
 (0.0676) (0.0773) (0.0692) (0.0673) (0.0723) 
post 0.0073 -0.0459 -0.0455 -0.0485 0.0599 
 (0.0751) (0.0689) (0.0720) (0.0719) (0.0864) 
w 0.1317** 0.1473** 0.1441** 0.1402** 0.1711** 
 (0.0575) (0.0628) (0.0558) (0.0560) (0.0706) 
stln_f_goal -0.1563*** -0.1180*** -0.1187*** -0.1167***  
 (0.0197) (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.0237)  
stav_inv 0.0263 0.0300 0.0358 0.0389  
 (0.0265) (0.0306) (0.0263) (0.0265)  
stn_fund 0.0513*** 0.0526*** 0.0573*** 0.0560***  
 (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0123) (0.0128)  
stinv_min 0.0427** 0.0443** 0.0458** 0.0467**  
 (0.0184) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0218)  
t_oth 0.1699*** 0.2111*** 0.2844*** 0.2840***  
 (0.0583) (0.0588) (0.0511) (0.0514)  
large 0.0288 0.0726** 0.0674**   
 (0.0283) (0.0284) (0.0281)   
f_self 0.1555* 0.1723**    
 (0.0848) (0.0792)    
stlkd 0.1280***     
 (0.0307)     
Constant 0.5484*** 0.5855*** 0.6204*** 0.6677*** 0.6715*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0689) (0.0609) (0.0575) (0.0842) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.3519 0.3013 0.2942 0.2900 0.2166 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Standard errors clustered at industry level 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from STATA 
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Robustness checks 
To further verify that the effect on the success of equity crowdfunding was exclusively 
due to the introduction of the new anti-corruption framework, a placebo test is conducted. 
Therefore, after defining as treated the Mexican campaigns and untreated the Brazilian and 
Chilean campaigns, the models are run pretending that the year of the regulation was 2014. In 
this way, it is possible to observe its effect on the probability of crowdfunding success in 2015. 
Therefore, the model from 2014 to 2015 is run, and the year 2015 is used as the treatment 
period. As previously, the choose to investigate the impact of the regulation one year later its 
passage is justified by the fact that in Mexico the government bureaucracy is recognized to be 
highly inefficient. Table 10 shows that the treatment effects estimated in the pre-treatment 
period are never statistically significant. 
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Table 10. The impact of the new anti-corruption framework on equity crowdfunding 
(Placebo test) 
This table reports the results for a set of linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable 
is project_status (a binary variable that identifies the success of equity crowdfunding projects). The 
treatment variable (w) is equal to 1 for Mexican campaigns, which were affected by the new framework 
against corruption, for year 2015, and 0 otherwise. Starting from the last columns (column 5), in each 
regression are included control variables showing social network information (stlkd), financial 
information (f_self), geographical information (large), information about investment to others 
campaigns by the team members (t_oth), the minimum allowed investment (stinv_min), the total number 
of company’s founders (stn_fund), the average investment (stav_inv), and finally information related to 
the amount that founders seek to raise using crowdfunding (stln_f_goal). The variables stln_f_goal, 
stav_inv, stn_fund, stinv_min, stlkd are standardized. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at 
industry level (three-digit sic codes, except in 4 cases providing only two-digit sic codes). The asterisks 
*, ** or *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 project_status project_status project_status project_status project_status 
VARIABLES      
      
treated -0.4312*** -0.4637*** -0.4786*** -0.4731*** -0.5114*** 
 (0.1176) (0.1242) (0.1126) (0.1076) (0.1346) 
post 0.0546 0.0232 0.0311 0.0273 0.0733 
 (0.1151) (0.1245) (0.1239) (0.1202) (0.1239) 
w -0.0670 -0.0735 -0.0796 -0.0818 -0.0679 
 (0.1220) (0.1279) (0.1283) (0.1253) (0.1315) 
stln_f_goal -0.1281*** -0.1117*** -0.1100*** -0.1073***  
 (0.0310) (0.0302) (0.0327) (0.0303)  
stav_inv 0.0073 0.0131 0.0211 0.0215  
 (0.0592) (0.0642) (0.0509) (0.0505)  
stn_fund 0.0500** 0.0660*** 0.0664*** 0.0644***  
 (0.0203) (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0162)  
stinv_min 0.0382** 0.0390** 0.0373** 0.0378**  
 (0.0152) (0.0171) (0.0148) (0.0140)  
t_oth 0.2705*** 0.3178*** 0.3300*** 0.3332***  
 (0.0797) (0.0835) (0.0866) (0.0838)  
large 0.0279 0.0471 0.0450   
 (0.0606) (0.0594) (0.0651)   
f_self 0.0887 0.0967    
 (0.1696) (0.1761)    
stlkd 0.0868***     
 (0.0203)     
Constant 0.5460*** 0.5805*** 0.5983*** 0.6281*** 0.6364*** 
 (0.0954) (0.1027) (0.0950) (0.0885) (0.1254) 
Year fixed effects No No No No No 
Observations 158 158 158 158 158 
R-squared 0.4249 0.3997 0.3974 0.3952 0.3073 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors clustered at industry level 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from STATA 
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Conclusions 
 
This study employs a unique database of successful and unsuccessful projects in three 
Latin American countries to investigate the impact of anti-corruption rules affecting the private 
sector on investment growth. The analysis is conducted by using a shock in regulation, 
represented by the introduction of a new anti-corruption framework in Mexico, to show the 
existence of a causal relation between the fight against the corruption and the investments in 
new projects. The initial assumption is that anti-corruption regulation increases investors’ trust, 
so that investors feel more confident to invest in an emerging segment as crowdfunding. 
Using a difference-in-difference estimation model, it emerges that following the new 
framework the equity crowdfunding projects in Mexico are more likely to succeed. Since 
Mexico is one of the most perceived corrupt country in the world (as proved by the CPI), these 
findings should be extendible to highly corrupt contexts. In this sense, this study can be useful 
to define political actions aimed to increase investments, and therefore to sustain economic 
growth, in countries publicly recognized as highly corrupt.  
Even if the results show that increasing anti-corruption regulation impacts on the 
success of equity crowdfunding campaigns, a decline in the mean of successful projects 
following the initial increase in 2016 is signalled (see Figure 2). This effect could be due to the 
repeated corruption scandals reported by various newspapers during the year 2016, such as that 
concerning the Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto and its presidential election50, or those 
involving the OHL México company, the Higa Group and the ICA-Alstom-Carso consortium51, 
but especially during 2017 (e.g., the scandal involving the former governor of Veracruz, Javier 
Duarte, who fled Mexico during the federal investigations on money laundering, 
embezzlement, buying homes using public funds52; and the famous “spyware scandal” 
involving the Mexican government accused of spying on journalists, activists, and opposition 
                                                          
50See “Un nuevo caso de corrupción estalla al Gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto: Una trama habría desviado 12 
millones de dólares de la secretaría de Hacienda al PRI para beneficiar al partido en las elecciones de 2016”. El 
Pais, available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/12/21/mexico/1513826104_500954.html. 
51See “4 casos de corrupción corporativa en México”. El Financiero (2016, April 14). Available at: 
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/empresas/casos-de-corrupcion-corporativa-en-mexico. 
52 See “Ex-Veracruz governor oversaw fake medical treatments for children”. El Pais (2017, January 18). Available 
at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/01/18/inenglish/1484740910_263904.html. 
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politicians through the use of spyware on their mobile phones53). All these corruption scandals 
are reflected in the worsening conditions of the CPI of the country, which reduced from a score 
of 30 in 2016 to 29 in 2017. Based on these results it could be concluded that the new rules 
should be implemented and put into practice to be really effective (see Gerring and Thacker, 
2005). In other words, regulation needs to be clear and credible in order to produce any positive 
effects, especially in highly corrupt environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 See “Mexican spy scandal escalates as study shows software targeted op position”. The Guardian (2017, June 
18). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/19/mexico-cellphone-software-spying-
journalists-activists. 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions, limitations and future directions 
 
This thesis is based on the premise that equity crowdfunding is becoming more and 
more an important source of funds to early-stage entrepreneurial firms, in both developed and 
developing countries. The rapid growth of equity crowdfunding market was likely due to a 
combination of favourable – and unfavourable - circumstances which have made it a multi-
billion dollar industry worldwide. On the one hand, the 2008 financial crisis has tightened credit 
availability, depressing early-stage finance for entrepreneurs and halving Europe's growth 
potential. On the other hand, financial innovations driven by FinTech companies (including 
equity crowdfunding platforms) have provided consumers with an excellent opportunity to 
become investors and take advantage of their knowledge in financial matters. Moreover, 
financial innovations and the new instruments available have facilitated credit access for 
entrepreneurs, enabling them to seek funding from anyone. 
Equity crowdfunding seems thus to have the potential to fundamentally change the 
investment and financing process, as well as to provide greater transparency especially in 
countries where high levels of corruption discourage any form of public or private investment. 
The important role played by equity crowdfunding should be properly recognised, and the 
increasing volumes of the market - in terms of the number of investors, the amount invested 
and sums raised for new ventures - should be properly favoured and encouraged by all the 
political forces. 
The academic literature on this topic has analysed the crowdfunding market with 
growing interest. However, the research and knowledge of this new phenomenon are still 
limited, and some questions do still arise.  
This doctoral thesis, which aims to address the topic of the equity crowdfunding in 
Europe and Latin America (the higher performing developing country in terms of utilizing 
crowdfunding, excluding Mainland China), it draws inspiration from the following research 
questions: 
Research question 1: Why do we need a harmonised regulation of crowdfunding in Europe? 
What are the challenges and risks to deal with?  
Research question 2: Do tax incentives promote crowdfunding investment in Europe? 
Research question 3: Does the fight against corruption increase the investors’ confidence 
in equity crowdfunding? 
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Answers to these questions provide an important step towards a better understanding of 
the functioning of crowdfunding markets. The three papers that constitute this thesis provide 
answers to the questions above by exploring specific strategies to drive equity crowdfunding 
growth and promote its use in financing entrepreneurship. 
In particular, the second chapter entitled “Harmonise Crowdfunding Regulation in 
Europe: Need, Challenges, and Risks” deals with the issue of the harmonisation of 
crowdfunding regulation in Europe which is currently the subject of debate by policymakers 
and regulators. The too high level of heterogeneity in crowdfunding regulation among European 
countries is described as a need, as well as a major risk and a big challenge. While the properly 
tailored national regimes may promote and stimulate crowdfunding market locally, these are 
not necessarily compatible with each other within a transnational context. A heavy 
fragmentation in the national regulatory frameworks of the Individual Member States makes a 
more aligned Pan-European market less likely. Furthermore, the state of regulatory uncertainty 
deters investors and, as a consequence, strangles investments in crowdfunding. European 
policymakers and regulators should design a single framework which reaches across and 
beyond the borders of the European Union with the objective of harnessing the great potential 
of crowdfunding-driven innovations. Only in this way will it be possible to establish an 
innovation-promoting regulatory regime opening new economic opportunities for Europe and 
generating real impact in terms of new business creation. 
The third chapter entitled “Do tax incentives promote crowdfunding investment in 
Europe?” investigates the role that tax incentives schemes can play in fostering investment in 
young, growing and innovative businesses through crowdfunding platforms. Seed and early-
stage funding are in fact extremely risky and early stage investors have to face the uncertainties 
that permeate investment projects, often without an adequate level of protection. Therefore, the 
tax incentive could support the de-risking of crowdfunding investment. The chapter begins by 
describing the different types of tax incentive schemes designed to promote crowdfunding 
investment in the sample of 5 countries (the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and 
Belgium). Building on a theoretical framework, it subsequently shows that the more tax 
incentives schemes are properly designed and tailored, the more investors, start-ups and other 
firms with low liquidity use crowdfunding as a source of funding. 
The fourth chapter entitled “Does the fight against corruption increase the investors’ 
confidence in equity crowdfunding?” addresses the concern with corruption in equity 
crowdfunding markets and the resulting response of Government regulation in Latin America. 
More in detail, it is based on the assumption that a high level of corruption, combined with 
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unstable economic policies, weak and poorly investors' protection, as well as inefficient 
government institutions, creates a "non-transparent" environment where the risk and 
uncertainty faced by investors are very high. In such a context, corruption creates mistrust 
among investors and deters crowdfunding investment, thus develop anti-corruption laws can be 
the key to fight corruption effectively, promote transparency, and to build the “culture of trust”, 
which is essential to crowdfunding success (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Ahlers et al., 2015; 
Courtney et al., 2017). Based on a unique database, with combined information from different 
equity crowdfunding platforms in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, this chapter investigates whether 
the introduction of the Mexican anti-corruption framework affecting both public and private 
spheres is able to increase investors’ confidence in crowdfunding investment. Implementing a 
set of linear probability regressions, it finds that the new Mexican anti-corruption law has 
increased the probability of success of equity crowdfunding projects in this country compared 
to Brazilian and Chilean projects, suggesting the existence of a causal relation between anti-
corruption rules and investments in a highly perceived corrupt environment, further 
characterized by a low level of investors’ protection. 
As with most studies, this thesis has several limitations which open the door to future 
research. To start, the first paper discusses recent reforms in national regulation concern 
improvements to the quality of crowdfunding regulation. While this study contributes to the 
ongoing regulatory debate on how to remove obstacles and design a single crowdfunding 
market in Europe, it requires further thinking. As future work, a way ahead could be to observe 
the implications of the harmonisation process from the perspective of investor protection at the 
European level. 
The second paper considers the effectiveness of tax incentives schemes in promoting 
crowdfunding investment in Europe. Although the paper contributes to extending the effect of 
tax incentives on investment in the novel context of equity crowdfunding, all findings should 
be viewed in the light of the qualitative and exploratory nature of the research work. Indeed, 
the paper can only offer a preliminary insight into the effect of tax incentives in stimulating 
crowdfunding investment. Further research could extend these insights in a quantitative way. 
Finally, the third research examines the effect of the Mexican anti-corruption law on 
equity crowdfunding investments. It would be interesting for future research to observe - 
potentially to different degrees - this effect for other asset classes as stocks, bonds, venture 
capital, private equity, etc. Moreover, while the Latin America sample remains unique and 
representative of the whole market in each country, its size is relatively small due to the recent 
93 
 
market development. A bigger and deepest sample would allow a better analysis of the 
treatment effect. 
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